Prestige and intimacy

THE CULTURAL MODELS BEHIND AMERICANS' TALK ABOUT GENDER TYPES[1]

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"... I can't believe we're talking about this!"

Margaret, an informant in a study of college-age women, said this in the midst of a "talking diary" interview. Earlier, the interviewer had limited herself to questions that a friend or new acquaintance might ask: What's been happening since I talked to you last? How are your classes going? Who is this Alice that you're talking about? When did you join volleyball club? Then, at a point in the interview, Margaret began to describe a skit about "jocks," "frat guys," "Susie Sororities," and other campus types. For a time, Margaret answered the interviewer's questions about the different types and how they could be identified and then interrupted herself:

Margaret: ... I can't believe we're talking about this!
Interviewer: Why?
Margaret: I don't know. You just don't sit around talking about it that much with anybody. It's just kind of there.
Interviewer: So it's not the sort of thing you'd sit around in your dorm room and talk about to your roommates?
Margaret: No, you allude to it more than anything else.
Interviewer: What do you mean, allude?
Margaret: You know, little things, like, "Oh, you're wearing your add-a-beads today." Things like that.
Interviewer: And that's all you have to say?
Margaret: Yeah, it's understood.

As might be expected, our participant–observation and interview data from a group of college-age Americans shows such types to be a conventional way of talking about other people. One hears words like *jock* or *hunk* or *freak* in conversations about who John so-and-so is, what he's like, what he's likely to do, and why he treated Mary or whomever the way he did. One also hears arguments about whether specific individuals can be described accurately as a "chauvinist" or whatever category has been proposed and sometimes, caricatures of men in general — as in Margaret's skit — couched in these terms. Names like *jerk* and *bitch* are also popularly used as insults and others like *honey* and *sweetheart* appear in compliments and endearments.

A striking aspect of this talk about other people is that a great deal of knowledge about gender-marked types is taken for granted. Women assume, for example, that telling another woman, "He's an asshole," will be taken as advice to avoid the male approaching them in a bar. They assume that other women know why calling a "jock" an "ass" to his face would be a risky thing to do or why referring to someone as a "hick" is relevant to a description of him as insensitive.[2]

Margaret and our other informants know implicitly what a number of scholars from a variety of disciplines (e.g., Agar 1980; Labov & Fanshel 1977; Rice 1980; Schank & Abelson 1977) have labored to make explicit; namely, with members of one's own cultural group, descriptions are constructed in conventional ways according to unspoken expectations and implicit common knowledge. The hearer is expected to infer missing information cued only by the information that is included and by the genre in which the information is presented. Margaret was chagrined by the interviewer's ignorance of types of men and women, knowledge that she, Margaret, had taken for granted in describing her skit to the interviewer. Not only was she startled by the interviewer's questions, but she also found them difficult to answer. It was hard work to make the information explicit.

Our purpose in this paper is to describe the understandings of male/female relations that Margaret and the other American women in our study take for granted when they converse with one another. We refer to this body of shared implicit knowledge about gender-marked types and about ways to talk about these types as a *cultural model*. Focusing on the manner in which these cultural models of gender are grasped by individuals, we are also interested in how this knowledge of gender types is mentally represented. Does Margaret simply know a list of definitions of *jock* and *frat guy* and other types of males and females, for example, or is her understanding organized in some other way?

A partial account of what women know about the types of males they talk about

STUDY A

In the first set of interviews we collected – the Study A–1 interviews – female informants were asked to list types of males. Male informants were asked to list types of females. Next, they were asked to describe the different types and to tell when someone might use such a term. Those 42 interviews revealed what is easily corroborated by listening to everyday conversation: Americans have an extremely rich vocabulary for talking about males and females. There are hundreds of terms for males and hundreds of terms for females. Furthermore, the vocabulary is colorful. Many of the words are derived by metaphorical extension from the domain of animals, the domain of foods, the domain of objects, occupations, or by

metonymic construction. New names are easy to make up and, as *turkey, libber,* and *feminist,* indicate, easily assimilated into common cultural knowledge (Holland & Davidson 1983; Holland & Skinner 1985).

An obvious way to present this American cultural knowledge of gender types is simply to list and describe or define all of these different kinds of males and females. We could even present the definitions in an economic fashion as in the ethnoscience tradition (see, for example, Tyler 1969 or Spradley 1972) by organizing and presenting the terms according to their taxonomic and paradigmatic relations. Tempting though this "dictionary definition" solution might seem, a decade of developments in cognitive anthropology, linguistics, and psychology suggests that this ethnosemantic approach cannot adequately describe how individuals organize their knowledge about gender types. As D'Andrade and associates have demonstrated, dictionary definitions often omit the very attributes of the topic that people think are the most important (D'Andrade et al. 1972). Studies of person and social types, in particular, show that what is important to people about these types is not what one must ascertain about persons to accurately classify them but rather what one must know in order to know how to behave toward them (Burton & Romney 1975; Harding & Clement 1980; White 1980).[3] For Ixil-Maya speakers discussed in Harding and Clement, for example, the important things about social roles are associated wealth, local affiliations, and their relationship to the civic-ceremonial complexes[4] – attributes that might not be included in dictionary-type definitions of the roles (see also Keesing 1979).

Rejecting dictionary-type definitions as a means of describing the cultural model of gender, we turned first to the "cognitive-structure" approach used in the Burton and Romney, Harding and Clement, and White studies. In the Study A-2, interviews informants were asked to do more systematically and more comprehensively what they do on a limited scale in conversation: They were asked to compare and contrast types of males and types of females according to whatever criteria they considered important. If we could find out the bases for comparison and contrast, then we would have an idea of the implicit propositions about gender types that organize women's thinking about men, and vice versa.

From the Study A-1 interviews, we selected 41 male types and 41 female types.[5] We wrote each subtype on a card and asked the respondents to sort the 41 types according to similarity and then to describe the similarities they saw among the types they had put into each pile. The reasons they gave for their sortings were recorded verbatim.

Important characteristics of gender-types. In the Study A-2 interviews, the respondents were allowed to compare and contrast the types according to whatever criteria seemed important to them. In most studies of gender stereotypes, the respondents are not allowed as much freedom; they are given a list of personality traits such as rational, warm, nurturant,

and independent and asked to say which traits are characteristic of males, which of females (Rosenkrantz et al. 1968; Spence, Helmreich, & Stapp 1975). If we had been willing to assume that the cultural model of gender is organized according to personality traits, we could have asked respondents to tell us which traits are associated with which types. However, since our Study A-1 interviews showed no exclusive emphasis on personality traits, and since more general studies (e.g., Bromley 1977) show that other characteristics of persons are considered important, we wanted to give respondents freedom to emphasize whatever aspects they considered important. (See Holland & Davidson 1983 for more discussion of the difference between most gender stereotype research and our own.) As it turned out, a variety of characteristics were described, as the following examples show:[6]

1341 [*jock*] a male who is impressed by his own physical prowess – like a matinee idol . . . a physically attractive or physically impressive athlete. People also use it [*jock*] to indicate a physically able and mentally deficient male

0931 [*chauvinist pig*] a guy who believes women are inferior

0131 [*dude, athlete, jock, macho, stud, hunk, Don Juan, playboy, egotist, frattybagger*][7] guys that think they are real cool, woman-pleaser types, conceited type people

0831 [*turkey, nerd, jerk, prick*] all derogatory; terribly insecure

2231 [*wimp, sissy, homosexual, queer, gay, hippie*] they all seem queer. Seem like terms for homosexual except *hippie* doesn't fit. They're all strange, socially unacceptable. They're all fags.

0631 [*man, guy, fellow, gentleman, boyfriend, fiance, lover, sweetheart*] they connote a more positive image . . . the most positive image of all the cards. They connote a kind of "boy back home": a more traditional role of a male as I think of it ideally.

Personality traits are mentioned frequently. Also mentioned are comments on looks, on specific attitudes, on the kind of a date the type makes, on sexual preference, and on many other specific mannerisms and background characteristics.

Our next task was to identify any themes or dimensions that underlay the multifaceted descriptions we had been given. We used a procedure that translates the measures of similarity from the sorting into a visual display. In the visual display that was created by a technique called multidimensional scaling, types that were often sorted together by the respondents were placed close together; types that were seldom sorted together were placed far apart.[8] This multidimensional scaling procedure was used to produce Figure 4.1, which indicates how male types were sorted by females, and Figure 4.2, which indicates how female types were sorted by male respondents.

Multidimensional scaling is primarily an aid to visualizing the patterns of comparison and contrast. It is also useful as a basis for estimating the

19

TYPES OF MEN

Effective/Likable [Endearments]

Doesn't Stress Male/Female Differences — Emphasizes/Exploits Male/Female Differences

X Sweetheart (-.03)
X Boyfriend (-.09)
X Love (-.07)
X Fiancé (-.10)
X Guy/Fellow (-.09)/(-.08)
X Macho (.09)   X Jack (.02)
Hunk (.04) X   X Don Juan (.06)
X Man (-.06)
X Gentleman (-.12)
Boy (-.09) X
X Bachelor (-.08)
X Athlete (-.01)   X Stud/Playboy X X (.11)/(.08)
X Dude (-.01)
Buck (.10) X   X X Chauvinist/Hustler (-.05)/(.02)
Frat/bagger (-.11)
Brain (.08) X   X Egoist (-.04)
Cowboy (-.07) X
X Gay/Homosexual (.63)/(.63)
Hippie (-.10)   Pimp (-.11)
X Skinhead (-.19)
Redneck (.14)   X Bastard (-.12)
X Queer (.56)   X Dog (-.14)   X Prick (-.13)
X Wimp (.05)   X Jerk (-.15)
X Sissy (.41)   X Turkey (-.20)   X Punk (-.15)
X Nerd (-.22)

Ineffective/Unlikable [Insults]

Figure 4.1. Three-dimensional representation of male social types (Stress = .147)

Low Status Possessions [Insults]

TYPES OF WOMEN

Overdemanding/Unlikable [Insults] — High-Status Possessions

X Whore (.18)
X Slut (.16)
Bitch (-.04) X
X Easy Lay (.18)
Butch (-.13) X   X Dyke (.18)
Shrew (-.09) X   X Nag (-.10)
X Strumpet (.03)   Dog (-.18) X
Cat (.21) X
X Scag (-.21)   X Prickteaser (.10)   X Cunt (.19)
X Beaver (.22)
X Amazon (-.20)
X Prude (-.11)
X Dumb Blonde (-.16)
X Airhead (-.15)
X Carolina Coed (-.12)
X Blonde (.08)
X Broad (.06)   X Chick (.33)   X Libber (-.19)   Old Lady (-.16) X
X Southern Woman (-.24)
X Belle (-.17)   Down to Earth Girl (-.19)   X Dish (.45)   X Lady (-.17)
X Fox/Doll (.42)/(.33)   X Cute Girl (.15)   X Woman (-.24)
Girl (-.23) X   Princess (.01) X
Babe (.31)
Honey (.10) X
Lover (-.12) X
Girlfriend (-.09) X   X Sweetheart (-.04)

Likable [Endearments]

Figure 4.2. Three-dimensional representation of female social types (Stress = .138)

number of conceptual dimensions of contrast that predominate in the sorts. For both the female and the male types, the sorting data were distorted if we allowed only two dimensions for the scaling; with three dimensions, the level of distortion measured as *stress* was acceptable. Thus, both figures show three dimensions. (The third dimension on Figures 4.1 and 4.2 is indicated by the numbers in parentheses.)

The multidimensional scalings are carried out according to a set of algorithms executed by a computer. The next steps are to examine the multidimensional scalings and interpret the dimensions of comparison and contrast the respondents seemed to be using when they sorted the types. To make these interpretations, we analyzed both the explanations given by the respondents in the A-2 interviews and the descriptions from the A-1 interviews. These data led us to the conclusion that females type males according to whether they are:

1. likely to use their position or attractiveness to females for selfish purposes,
2. ineffectual and unlikable, and/or
3. unusual in their sexual appetites

Chauvinists, playboys, and *jocks,* for example, are seen as types who use their social position as males or their attractiveness to women for selfish purposes; *guys, fellows, boys,* and *gays,* in contrast, are seen as being unlikely to try to capitalize on these advantages. *Jerks, nerds,* and *turkeys* are inept and unattractive, whereas *boyfriends, financees, sweethearts,* and, to a lesser extent, *guys* and *fellows,* are attractive and effective. The sexual appetites of *gays* and to a lesser extent *playboys,* are out of the ordinary and an important aspect of their lives. For *nerds* and *skinheads,* the opposite is true; sexuality is not a particularly notable aspect of their behavior. What we are arguing from the cognitive-structure analysis is that women focus on and organize their thinking about male types according to these three aspects of male characteristics and behavior.

Males do not compare and contrast females on the same three bases just described, although there are some complementary aspects. Males compared female types according to their:

1. prestige as a (sexual) possession/companion
2. tendency to be overdemanding and engulfing
3. sexiness

Bitches and *scags,* for example, are types that are overdemanding; *girlfriends* and *sweethearts* and, to a lesser extent, *women,* are supportive and helpful. *Foxes* and *whores* are sexually enticing; *prudes* and *dykes* are sexually repelling. *Foxes* and *dolls* are high-status sexual companions, whereas *whores* and *easy lays* are low status. These characteristics are important to males about females.

Summing to this point: Study A has provided partial information on the cultural models of gender types for our samples. As a cognitive entity, a cultural model may be defined as learned mental representations of some aspect of the world – in this case, gender types. These mental representations or schemas actively guide attention to components of the world and provide inferences about these components and their various states and form a framework for remembering, reconstructing, and describing experiences. (For a related conceptualization of *schema,* see, for example, Neisser 1976 or Rice 1980.)

Study A provided the broad outlines of the characteristics that females are guided to look for in types of males, and vice versa. These models tell females what to pay attention to about new males they meet, what to be on guard about in males they already know, and what questions to ask about newly identified types of males.

Limitations. On the basis of Study A, we felt we had correctly grasped the characteristics of male and female types that were important to the respondents. We also felt that based on what we had learned about these important characteristics and what we had learned about the conventions for naming types, we could correctly predict how the respondents would react to types we had not included in the interviews and even how they would be likely to react to names of newly identified types. Using a method such as Burton's (1972), we could have undertaken a validation of our interpretations and predictions; however, we were concerned about certain limitations of our approach and decided instead to examine another source of data.[9]

The type of analysis we had done – cognitive-structure analysis – did not adequately present the total amount of information we had learned from the interviews. Cognitive-structure analysis is predicated on the idea of underlying "dimensions of meaning" as the organizing structure for the set of terms – in this case, gender types. The question of how these dimensions are mentally grasped by informants has received little explicit attention in the literature (see D'Andrade 1976 for an exception), but the implication is that the dimensions or characteristics of importance can be described accurately as single attributes or features of meaning.

We had difficulty in finding and, as is discernible from the labels affixed to Figures 4.1 and 4.2, did not manage to isolate in every case, a single attribute or descriptor that seemed to capture the sense of the "characteristic" the respondents were talking about as the basis for their comparisons of the different types of males and females. Even when we did use two attributes or a descriptive phrase, we found it was not clear from our descriptions how women integrated "ineffective" and "unlikable" as co-occurring characteristics, for example, or why "exploitation of male/female differences" should not also be coupled with "unlikable." Furthermore, we realized that our descriptions of the characteristics as simple attributes were also limited because these attributes did not offer any

insight into the affect our respondents displayed when they discussed the different types. There was information from the interviews that illuminated these questions, but clearly that information was not being effectively conveyed by the cognitive-structure analysis that presented the "characteristics" as though they were simple attributes. A more accurate way of describing the "characteristics" had to be found.

A SECOND LOOK AT STUDY A

We returned to the A-1 and the A-2 interviews to find out how the respondents had communicated a sense of what *jocks* or *wimps* or *broads* are like. We reread the 460 or so descriptions of individual types in the A-1 interviews and the 250 or so explanations for the groupings of types in the A-2 inerviews.

In both sets of interviews, the descriptions were strikingly similar and included a variety of information. Some descriptions were limited to single descriptors reminiscent of the attribute-like features we had first looked for to describe the "dimensions" from the multidimensional scaling. These single descriptors often had to do with character, mood, or personality:

0231 [sissy] a male who is effeminate
0431 [bastard] a male who is mean
0331 [turkey, nerd, jerk, frattybagger] these are people who are just plain stupid
1031 [stud] a guy who is horny

Other single-focus descriptions contrasted with these in that they depicted not the type's inner state, but rather his acts or behavior:

0731 [hustler] a male who takes advantage of a person
0931 [pussy] a guy who doesn't stand up for what he believes in or who is a coward
0931 [pimp] a man who prostitutes women

Another large set of the descriptions were unlike the ones just quoted in that they included more than one type of information. They contained information about the type's inner state *and* information about his behavior *and* other information, such as females' reactions to him.

0431 [boy, dude, dog, wimp, hippie, turkey, punk, nerd, jerk, prick, skinhead] these are losers - all the names that you call really queer dates. They're usually immature or ugly, or think they're cool, but aren't at all. They try to impress girls, but actually make fools of themselves.
2231 [redneck, dog, turkey, punk, nerd, jerk, skinhead, cowboy, brain] I think of little 98-pound weaklings - jerks. They're all ugly little jerks that you'd never want to be seen with, or never want to talk to. You cannot get rid of them.
1131 [couchwarmer] a guy who is too cheap to take you out so he takes you to his home all the time.

0431 [lover, athlete, jock, macho, stud, egotist, bastard, hunk, Don Juan, playboy] these are the typical jock-type, good looking but they know it. Can get any type of girl they want because girls usually go for them. They're popular.
0331 [Don Juan, playboy] implies someone who likes to play around - women are attracted to them but they don't set up a serious relationship.
0331 [ladies' man] a friendly man who is deceitful. Ladies' man and macho man are variations on the same theme - one tends to have larger biceps.
1331 [boyfriend, fiancé, lover, sweetheart] these are all subtitles of what we would call the man who is showing the romantic side of a man in relation to a woman.
0431 [sissy, homosexual, queer, gay] they're the type you find in my dancing class. They're just all gay, pretty unmasculine, talk with a lisp.

The respondents were clearly not limiting their thinking to a single characteristic of the male types they were describing. In order to convey their sense of the social types, they were providing, it might be surmised, the outlines of a social drama, or sometimes, a scene from the drama. In the scenes - which are sometimes described as though they were being visualized - the male type plays a role in an encounter or a relationship with another person, usually a female. He is her date or perhaps her friend or her would-be lover. His style of playing the role is different from how an ordinary male would play the role. In the descriptions, the unusual aspects of his style are communicated by an account of his actions or a description of his intentions, personality traits, or beliefs, He is friendly, but deceitful; he thinks he is cool, but actually makes a fool of himself. Sometimes, we also are told the female's reactions to such males (e.g., "women are attracted to them," or "they can get any girl they want").[10]

The recognition that the respondents were constructing their descriptions of gender types from social scenes or perhaps scenarios made it clear why trying to describe the characteristics of the types as single attributes was a difficult and perhaps impossible task. In trying to represent the information conveyed to us by the respondents as single attributes, we had undertaken the task of describing a gestalt of social information and action in a few words. Although the multidimensional scaling had assisted us in our identification of the key behaviors and characteristics of the different types, it did not help us in the identification and description of the taken-for-granted social world in which these characteristics are significant.

The realization that the respondents were thinking of the types in terms of social dramas rather than single attributes prompted further study. The aim of Studies B and C - analyses of two other sets of data - was to uncover premises about the social worlds associated with the scenarios: What makes types such as *jocks* or *wimps* so special that they are labeled as different from ordinary males? What were the respondents assuming about

normal relations between males and females that made these types stand out?

Besides the implications of our reanalysis of Study A, the work of linguist Fillmore also encouraged us to pursue the examination of this taken-for-granted world of male/female relations. We noted a similarity between the kinds of *scenes* that Fillmore (1975:124) argues are associated with linguistic frames and the descriptions given us by the respondents. Fillmore has presented his proposed *frame semantics* by elucidating the meaning of words such as *orphan* and *widow*. He (1975:129; 1982:34) has argued that the meaning of *bachelor*, for example, is integrally related to a conceptualization of a social world in which such things as bachelors exist. *Bachelor* cannot simply be defined as an unmarried male, for the role of *bachelor* is not relevant to all the social worlds in which unmarried males are found. Is Pope John Paul II a bachelor? Is a trice-married, presently divorced man a bachelor? Fillmore says that the category of *bachelor* is not relevant to these cases because the worlds of the Pope and the trice-married, divorced man deviate from the conceptualization we have of the social world in which bachelors exist.

A complete analysis of the type suggested by Fillmore is given by Sweetser (this volume) for the word *lie*. She shows that the meaning of *lie* is not detachable from a conceptualized social world in which communication between individuals follows a culturally standardized, normative pattern. In this simplified world, the telling of false information has certain consequences, such as harm to the recipient of the lie, and thus is clearly a reprehensible act. Perhaps, we reasoned, the exploitation of male/female differences has particular poignancy to the women in our sample because of the implications of exploitation in the simplified world in which *Don Juans, machos, hunks,* and *chauvinists* are relevant characters. Perhaps females attach importance to ineffectiveness and insensitivity in males because this characteristic poses a difficult problem for what is taken for granted to be the normal course of male/female relationships.

STUDIES B AND C

Studies B and C were conducted in the same locale as Study A with the same age population two years after the completion of Study A. Studies B and C consisted of participant-observation research and tape-recorded one-to-two-hour interviews. The 23 informants of Study B and the 10 informants of Study C were each interviewed an average of 8 and 5 times, respectively. The participation-observation research was useful because it revealed the extent to which the same kind of talk about males and females that occurred in the interviews was also occurring in the everyday activities of the informants.

The Study B interviews primarily consisted of "talking diary" interviews in which the informant was asked to describe what had been happening to her since the interviewer had last seen her. In the course of these interviews, which took place over a year-long period, the respondents frequently talked about encounters and relationships with males. As suggested by the excerpt from the interview with Margaret at the beginning of the paper, the "talking diary" interviewers tended to stay within the bounds of questions the women were accustomed to answering and talking about with their peers.

The Study C interviews provided a more out-of-the-ordinary task for the informants. They were asked to tell about their first and then subsequent memories of someone, usually someone with whom they had had a relatively long relationship. After they had told about the memories as they wished, the interviewer asked in-depth questions about their impressions of and reasoning about the individual, often requiring the informant to make explicit information or beliefs about males and females that she would have otherwise taken for granted.

In searching through these interviews for relevant passages, we looked for passages in which the gender of the other was of explicit significance to the informant's reasoning about the other person. Any passage which included reference to the gender-marked social types that had been identified in Study A-1 was automatically consulted. Our guiding questions were: What do our informants assume about ordinary relationships between males and females? and What are the taken-for-granted worlds in which these male and female types interact? As it turned out, this taken-for-granted world is a world of prestige and intimacy gained and lost.

The taken-for-granted world of male/female relationships

In the taken-for-granted world of male/female relations, from the perspective of the women in our study, a male earns the admiration and affection of a female by treating her well. Intimacy is a result of this process. The female allows herself to become emotionally closer, perhaps as a friend, perhaps as a lover, perhaps as a fiancée, to those attractive males who make a sufficient effort to win her affection. Besides closeness and intimacy, the process of forming a relationship also has to do with prestige. When a male is attracted to a female and tries to earn her affection by good treatment, her attractiveness is validated and she gains prestige in her social group. For his part, the male gains prestige among his peers when he receives admiration and affection from and gains intimacy with females.

Normally, prestigious males are attracted to and establish close relationships with prestigious females, and vice versa. Sometimes, however, a male can succeed in winning the affection of a female whose prestige is higher than his own. However, the more attractive she is, the more he must compensate for his lack of prestige by spectacular efforts to treat her well. Correspondingly, females sometimes do form close relationships with males who have higher prestige than they do. When the male is more

attractive or has higher prestige than the female, she often must compensate by giving her affection to him without his doing anything to earn it.

Several aspects of this world can be illustrated by interpretations that informants made of their experiences with males. It should be noted that although the interpretations included in the following sections pertain primarily to romantic relationships, our data indicate that friendships between a male and a female are interpreted in terms of the same taken-for-granted world.

THE INGENIOUS BEAU

Karla had an "official boyfriend," Christopher.[11] Meanwhile, another guy, Alex, was doing things like showing up at her door with the gift of an egg, dyed purple. For a visit to listen to records, he appeared dressed in a costume befitting the punk-rock genre, a costume he had creatively assembled from castaway clothes and a dead carnation. What meaning could this bizarre behavior have? Karla interpreted it as an effort to win her affection:

Karla: . . . if you want to get down to brass tacks, the main crux of the problem [with the relationship with Christopher] right now is this new guy. Because I must say he fascinates me, he fascinates me more than anyone I've ever known and furthermore he's making the most interesting efforts to get me.

Alex was treating Karla well. Being well treated by a male means being shown special considerations and courtesies; having one's values, desires, and feelings taken seriously; and being appreciated for one's qualities and accomplishments. Some other examples of such treatment besides the creative efforts of Alex included things, in Karla's eyes, like wearing a jacket on a casual date and being pampered when one is feeling sick.

Another informant, Diana, gives additional examples in a life history interview. She begins by talking about how attractive females want to date attractive males and then switches to the kind of treatment she expects from males.

Interviewer: How about dates . . . any more to add on dates? What was important to you?
Diana: Well, if you were fairly nice looking you wanted to date a good looking guy, I mean, that was probably all part of our ego, we wanted to have the best looking date or things like that . . . of course you wanted to be attractive to them [males] you know. Like I said, you wanted them to think that you were pretty . . . .
Interviewer: Did you want them to think anything else?
Diana: Of course you wanted them to think you had a good personality, that you weren't just beauty and no brains. But it was important to me for someone to respect my values and most of my friends were the same. Of course, there's, in every community there's a few girls that don't have such strict moral values, but we wanted to make sure that the guys that we went out with did respect that or we wouldn't go out with them any more. All my friends were about the

same in that respect; we wanted our dates to respect us and treat us like ladies, not like one of the fellows.
Interviewer: What would constitute being treated like a lady?
Diana: Well not only respecting our moral values, but to me, at least, maybe it was because I was in the role of the female where you were old-fashioned and so on, but it was important for them to open the door for me, seat me if we went out to eat, to open car doors for me, just common courtesy that a lot of times you don't even think about.

KARLA THE GERM

Bad treatment is being ignored, being unappreciated or scorned, and being treated like an object rather than a person. In describing her relationship with Christopher, Karla recounted a phase of their relationship in which she became disgruntled with how Christopher was treating her. The situation came to a crisis when she returned to school after a holiday and promptly came down with a bad case of the flu. Instead of being solicitous, Christopher tried to avoid her:

Karla: Well I was . . . feeling so horrible that night about nine o'clock that I put on my pajamas and went to bed, and Christopher comes by at 9:30 to see me. And he says, "What are you doing in bed?" Well [when I told him], he just kind of like turned pale. And I thought that it would be nice, very nice of him [*laughs*] to sort of well, you know, bring me a little chicken soup, tell me to have a nice day, send me a little card. I really wanted that, but instead he just, . . . he wasn't exactly rude, but he sort of got out of the room as fast as he could cause he's so scared he'd get it, and I can understand that, his practice schedule, he plays with a university group, if he got sick it would screw him up a lot, but I don't like being treated like I have germs, whether I have them or not. . . .

Later that week, Christopher took her to a play even though he was still afraid of catching the flu from her:

He didn't say this, but he went out with me anyway, but he was just kind of like on edge all night long because of that and I think that's why he started making some nasty remarks. . . . So that made me angry and that's why we had our big fight. . . .
Interviewer: How did uh, why did you . . .
Karla: I said, "Why, how dare you treat me like a germ?" And he asked me to explain this, so I did and I told him that I had not had a good time that evening [*laughs*] and, I said that, well . . . it was earlier in the evening in the restaurant that he had made the nasty comment about my family. I said, "Christopher, how can you sit there and say something like that, and act like your family and your family's background is so much better than mine when this very evening, Christopher, you have behaved with no class whatsoever?" . . .

Karla interpreted Christopher's behavior as bad treatment, treatment that suggested that she was nothing more than an object - a germ. She thought that he had overestimated his own attractiveness or prestige rela-

tive to hers and that he had no right to expect her affection if he continued to treat her in a condescending manner. Eventually, she let him know she was angry.

Although Karla changed her interpretation after another talk with Christopher, she initially took his behavior as meaning that he considered his prestige to be higher than hers. In subsequent passages, she described how she responded by challenging and bringing about a change in his definition of their relative positions. Evidence of the negotiation about relative prestige or attractiveness and its significance is also evident in the following passage.

THE UPPER HAND

"I just don't want him to get the upper hand on me. . . ."

Karen is describing a guy she has just started to date. She has been talking about the times he calls for dates and how much he likes her. She goes on to explain that she has not been completely straightforward with him:

Karen: . . . I just don't want him to get the upper hand on me, you know. Like I play games with him . . .
Interviewer: Could you give an example?

In response to this question, Karen discusses in a very oblique way how northerners' (Hal, the new guy that she is dating, is a northerner) morals are different from those of southerners (Karen is from North Carolina). She describes northerners' sexual morals as being more "open and carefree."

Interviewer: When you said that part about you didn't want him to get the upper hand, could you talk a little more about that?
Karen: I didn't want him to think that I was really crazy about him and that he could just use me, you know, maybe if he knew I'd want to go out with him and stuff like that. So that's why I just sort of let him, in fact I was trying to get it with him, you know, get the upper hand with him, but it didn't work. He's the same way, you know.
Interviewer: How did you try to do that and why didn't it work?
Karen: Well, you know, I'd tell him – he'd say something about going out and I'd say, "Well just . . . we probably will, but it's a little early right now." I'd do stuff like that, and he'd ask me, he asked me if I had, um, well the first night he asked me if I had a boyfriend back home and I didn't say anything, and he says, "Well, I figured you did." And, I said, "Well . . ."; I didn't say anything, you know. I just told him that I dated a couple of guys, you know. I didn't tell him if I still saw them or not, you know.

She goes on to explain other ways in which she tries to give Hal the impression or allows him to infer that she has other boyfriends, including such subterfuges as sometimes leaving the dorm when she thinks he is going to call.

Here, Karen has read a lot into Hal's pattern of calling and asking her out and making overtures to her. She has interpreted his behavior as a preliminary move in a negotiation in which she and he work out whether his prestige or attractiveness is higher than, equal to, or lower than hers. If she appears to have an active social life, then her prestige as an attractive female is in evidence and he will not be able to treat her badly by taking her for granted and not calling when he says he will or, perhaps, although she does not directly say this, expecting her to become sexually intimate faster than she would choose to. If, on the other hand, his prestige is high, as evidenced by the fact that she finds him extremely attractive, then he will be able to exploit her and treat her badly if he wants to. She would rather that her prestige be seen as higher than his so she acts to bring about that interpretation.

Women judge whether their friends' relationships make sense in terms of the treatment they receive from males. Whether bad treatment is understandable to other women comes up a number of times in our data. From the cultural model, a female may form a relationship with a very attractive male even though he treats her badly. An example of the application of this idea comes from Diana. Diana has been having a number of run-ins with Donny, her boyfriend, who attends a university in a nearby city. Their calls often end in recriminations and tears on Diana's part. Her friends on the hall constantly point out to her that Donny is being mean, that he's just a "jerk." Diana's reply to them can be summarized in her words: "It must be love." She implies that she finds him so attractive that she is willing to sacrifice good treatment for the sake of being around him. Her friends are not convinced. They think he's not worth the trouble he causes Diana; he does not seem all that attractive to them.

Problematic males

These stories describe experiences that the informants interpret according to a set of assumptions about normative relationships between males and females. In the taken-for-granted world constituted by these assumptions, arrogance in a male has special implications and getting involved with an "asshole" has predictable consequences. Arrogance, as elaborated below, has implications for a male's assessment of his own status relative to that of the females around him; the ineffectiveness or insensitivity of an *asshole* is problematic because of the way he is likely to treat females. This taken-for-granted world, in other words, provides the background against which several basic types of males pose a special challenge or problem for females. These types were foreshadowed by the dimensions identified in the multi-dimensional scaling. The problematic males are those who are arrogant and use their position or attractiveness as males for their own selfish purposes in interactions with females, are insensitive and unlikable, and have unusual sexual appetites.

ARROGANT AND SELFISH MALES

From our informants' interpretations, males who think they are "God's gift to the earth," "who think that anyone without a penis doesn't exist," "who are arrogant and out for themselves," and "who are good looking, but know it" are problematic because they are likely to assume that they do not have to earn a female's admiration and affection and intimacy; they are likely to expect these things from females simply on the basis of their looks or other claims to high prestige.[12] They are likely to be able to exploit their attractiveness and prestige for their own selfish purposes, treating females in a bad or demeaning manner, and not suffer for their behavior. Examples of how informants see these *jocks* and other types are provided by the data.

Annette and Sam. In one of her interviews, Karen told about an encounter she summarized as follows:

Karen: A friend of mine [Annette] invited us, invited several of us to a party at a dorm. And, she told us that there'd be . . . , a couple of people there that she really liked a lot, guys, that is . . . well, they're on the basketball team, you know, big jocks and stuff like that, you know, and . . . when we got there, um, the main one she wanted to see . . . I mean, he just, he didn't even hardly acknowledge her presence. He practically didn't even speak to her. . . . And, it just sort of messed up the whole party - mainly for her, and because of that, it messed it up for all of us.

The remainder of the interview was devoted to questions about this episode:

Interviewer: What were your expectations when you went to the party?
Karen: . . . I expected to meet a couple of the players, and . . . I expected, you know, some real nice guys. And I thought that well, they'd be real glad to see her, and you know, just real friendly and everything. And, but, they, they didn't.
Interviewer: What . . . how did they act when they came? I guess there were two of them that came at different times.
Karen: Yeah. One of them [Robert] was real nice to her and glad to see her and all, you know. That wasn't the main one she wanted to see, the one she wanted to see [Sam] acted real stuck-up, you know, as if she wasn't even there.
Interviewer: Oh, how did he do that?
Karen: He, he ignored her. And, I mean, he saw her several times . . . she'd be standing practically beside him, and he wouldn't say anything . . . this other girl came and he just talked to her practically the rest of the night.

Later, the interviewer asks Karen why she thinks Sam acted as he did:

Karen: I don't know if he was, if he, if, I don't know if maybe she just had it in her head that he liked her, or if he was just, if he didn't want her around, and he was just trying to talk to this other girl or something. But he did act, he acted sort of too good for her, you know?

The interviewer asked for more detail about why Sam acted as he did:

Karen: . . . maybe because he was a big jock on campus or something, that he thought, that, you know, she was just an average girl, and he was too good for her, or something. But, um, I didn't look at him that way until he walked - you know, he walked in, and then he just sort of carried himself like, you know, everybody's looking at me. And, I didn't like that at all about him. And, um, he, he was just, it just seemed like he was standing there waiting for people to come and talk to him, you know. Instead of him acknowledging anybody else. . . .

Karen talked about how upset Annette was and said she thought perhaps if Annette could talk to some other guy, she would feel better.

Interviewer: What? Why would that make her feel better?
Karen: Um, uh, she probably, I don't know, I guess just to boost her confidence back up, or to make her feel like she's really somebody. Instead of what he, I mean he made her feel like she wasn't even alive. . . .

Annette continued to be upset about the incident, and Karen explained that Annette was trying to reason out why Sam acted as he did:

Interviewer: What were some of the ways she reasoned it out?
Karen: Um, well, she thought at first maybe because he was with that girl, he didn't want to talk to anybody else. And, but then, he was talking to other girls that were walking by, and um, then she was thinking, maybe he was mad at her, but she didn't know why, you know, she was just thinking of different stuff like that.
Interviewer: Did you think of any things like that too?
Karen: Uh, not really, I, I, it's gonna sound terrible. I thought, well he just didn't want to, didn't want to see her at all, cause he just didn't, I don't know, what I thought was that, he was like I said before, he was some big jock on campus, you know, and he just wanted the real, um, just certain girls around him, you know.
Interviewer: What . . . what kinds?
Karen: Real pretty, you know, real - (I think Annette's pretty, too) - and he just, you know, to make him look that much more better, you know. That's what I was thinking, after I, after I saw what he was doing to her.
Interviewer: Why would, why do you think that he would want that, would want these girls?
Karen: I guess to help his image, you know, make him look that much more better.

In Karen's interpretation, Annette is treated badly. Her presence is not even acknowledged by Sam. The situation is an embarrassing one because Annette has revealed her attraction to Sam yet he has ignored her; she has been shown to be less attractive or of lower prestige than Sam. She's just an average girl.

In Karen's eyes, Sam's attractiveness is diminished. She says, "I didn't

think he was attractive anymore." Her inclination is to demean him, to label him as a lower status male, an unattractive type:

Karen: . . . I wanted to tell him, he, you know, what he did to her, you know, that he was acting like an ass.

She does not call him an "ass," however, because she did not think Annette would have wanted her to and because he was around a group of people and she did not want to "make a fool" of herself either. Obviously, other people, such as the woman he was talking with, did not think Sam was an ass.

Another part of this story contrasts Sam with Robert. Attractive males do not necessarily exploit their attractiveness for their own ends; they are not necessarily demeaning to females who have less prestige than they do. Robert was nice. He treated Annette very well and even went out of his way for Annette's friend, whom he had just met:

Karen: Oh, I like him [Robert] a lot, yeah. Cause he, cause he made her laugh and, he was just, so, he was real nice to all of us. And, um, well, one of my friends wanted a beer, you know, but there was this real long line, so he just walks right up. He takes a cup and goes and breaks in front of everybody, you know, and gets it and brings it. He takes a cup and goes back to her, you know. That really impressed me, there, cause he didn't know her, he didn't have to do that. You know. And um, that's just the type of guy he was, you know, just real friendly and nice to everybody.

Robert was attractive and he treated Annette, his friend, in a way that earned her affection and admiration (and Karen's, too). Even though he was attractive and did not have to do things for Annette, he did. The difference between him and Sam, as Karen interpreted it, was that Robert just wanted to have a good time whereas Sam wanted to make himself look better.

Not only was Sam guilty of demeaning Annette, he, in Karen's interpretation, was also using females to further his own ends. He was not sincerely trying to earn their affection and admiration and giving them good treatment in return. He was simply using them to get what he wanted – in the case of the party, increased evidence of his own attractiveness:

Karen: . . . you know it's just like they're [guys like Sam] they're out for themselves, you know, just to make, "I just want to be seen." You know, it's like they're just using the girl or something. . . .

INEFFECTIVE AND UNLIKABLE MALES

In contrast to males who are problematic because they are attractive but prone to treat women badly, there is a second type whose labels are used as insults. Karen, for example, fantasized insulting Sam by telling him he was acting like an "ass." Diana's friends claimed Donny was acting like a "jerk." *Jerks, nerds, turkeys,* and *asses,* among others (see Figure 4.1)

constitute this second type of problematic male. These males are both unattractive and insensitive and thus unlikely to receive a female's admiration and affection. Lacking sensitivity to what females want, these low-prestige males are neither attractive to women nor are they effective at pleasing females and thereby earning their affection. Two accounts from the data illustrate interpretations of experience in which this type of male plays a part.

Patty and the hick. Patty was asked to describe someone whom she knew from her work. She picked Erve, a colleague, at the school in which she teaches. As a potential friend, she found Erve wanting:

Patty: . . . And I mostly don't care for him very much. Part of it is the fact that he's a real Okie kind of person, in a derogatory sense, and I mean it that way, he's a real hick. . . .

Patty goes on to list many things she dislikes about Erve, including his lack of a sense of humor, the strange things he says in the middle of conversations, the way he usurped the position of the coach, the tactless way he deals with the students, his disruption of the faculty lunches by his topics and styles of conversation, the fact that he asked her her age but did not tell his, and so forth. Furthermore, he did not seem to realize that she disliked him:

Patty: . . . and the other thing that now tops it off is for some reason he's decided I'm his friend and he will come and talk to me, and there's a period of the day, it's usually about twenty minutes of three . . . when everybody fades out and you can get something done, and he will come in there if he hasn't got anything to do and he will talk a blue streak, and I feel resentment about that. And I'm a passive-aggressive person so I never say anything. I just sit there and feel, and he's not long on sensitivity, so he never picks up the vibrations . . . I disagree with just about everything I seem to have noticed about him.

At a later point in the interview, Patty further elaborates the idea that Erve is oblivious to her desires and feelings:

Patty: . . . But in an annoying situation, I will put up with the situation rather than make waves. However, to someone who knows me, the air is absolutely thick with unharmonious vibrations.
Interviewer: And he doesn't?
Patty: No, he does not pick up on those things at all. There are people who will receive such feelings and ignore them and there are people who do not receive, and he is a nonreceiver.

In describing his lack of attention to her feelings, she reiterated a situation in which she had complained to him about his treatment of a student and he had simply made a joke of her statement as though he did not understand she was angry:

Patty: . . . I was really peeved. I did it quite pleasantly, but anyone with a grain of sensitivity would have noticed that I was peeved. Carl [another teacher] knew that I was peeved; Alice [the principal] knew that I was annoyed and they heard me say the words in the same tone of voice that this guy did.

Erve, in short, is remarkable in his lack of sensitivity.

Patty also points out in the interview that Erve has a lower-class style about him, is "uncivilized," and has very parochial tastes in many aspects of life. Her comments, plus those of other informants and respondents in Study A, suggest that lower-class males are thought to be insensitive to females and therefore are not likely to treat a female well. Upper-class males are more likely to know how to respond to a female and thus are more likely to be able to earn the admiration and affection of females. Other sources of insensitivity are stupidity and meanness of character.

Rachel and Edward. The main problem with the kinds of males who get classified as "jerks" and "nerds" and so forth is that they are often obnoxious. They are so insensitive that they cannot even tell they are un-attractive to the female and so they often act as if the relationship were a closer one than what the female wants. Erve, for example, apparently could not sense Patty's negative opinion of him. He would come to her room and talk to her for long periods of time despite the fact that she did not want to talk to him. Another example of a male persevering in trying to get closer to a female is given by Rachel in her description of a painful and frustrating weekend with Edward.

Rachel had been friends with Edward for many years. They had been planning to go on a weekend camping trip with two other friends. At the last minute, Edward casually phoned Rachel to tell her that the other friends had decided not to go and that he and Rachel should stay at his university instead of going to the mountains. Rachel was annoyed. She did not want to be alone with him for such a long time. However, because it was too late to arrange anything else and because she really wanted to go somewhere, she went to see him. The entire weekend turned out to be a frustrating struggle over the closeness of their relationship, with Edward indicating he wanted them to be closer and Rachel indicating she wanted the relationship to be less close. This struggle had been going on for quite a while:

Rachel: . . . several periods during our relationship he's wanted to get closer than I wanted to get. I don't know, he's a really great guy and I feel real close to him, deep down, but personality-wise, we just have a lot of conflicts, and I don't know, he requires a lot of patience from me. To be around him I have to kind of say, "Okay. You're going to be around Edward, really put yourself down on his level." And he really needs me, as a friend, I feel like, and he tells me that. So I'm just not as enthusiastic about our relationship as he is. Lately, he's just, he's been, every time we've been together, which is several times a month, he'll bring up this stuff about, you know, he just can't help the way he feels

and he can't stand it anymore, blah, blah, and I've told him how I felt, I can't change my feelings and I'm really tired of talking about it. . . .

Rachel's assessment of Edward is that he speaks in a "hicky way" and is not "attractive to the opposite sex." His ideas have not developed much beyond what they were many years ago when they first became friends:

Rachel: . . . he seems very immature to me now. Sometimes I feel like he must have been dropped on his head when he was a baby, I mean, he's really slow sometimes.

That Rachel does not feel attracted to Edward is a problem in the face of his efforts to win her affection:

Interviewer: How does it make you feel that he wants the relationship to be closer, whatever?
Rachel: It makes me feel real sad because I don't feel that way at all, and I know how much it means to him and there's really nothing that can be done about the situation, so it hurts me that he feels that way and it seems kind of like a hopeless situation right now, because he really can't get along too well right now without our friendship, but it's painful for him to have the friendship too. It also repulses me too because I can't stand the sight of us being more than friends. I'm just not attracted to him, and [then there's] our personality differences, it just never entered my mind at all.

Despite his efforts to treat her well, Rachel is not attracted to Edward, and because of his perseverance in his attempts to get closer, she becomes irritated by his lack of acceptance of her feelings. Although he cares for her and does things for her, he is not attractive enough or sensitive enough for her to want a closer relationship with him. Rachel attributes his disregard of her negative feelings to his family background and possibly his fundamentalist religious upbringing. She says he may have gotten the mistaken idea that males can earn a female's closeness, or at least that he can win hers, simply by dint of will power. Not only was Edward's attractiveness not sufficient for how close he wanted the relationship to be, but he also had the problem of not being able to accept that he was pursuing a lost cause. This made him even more unattractive in Rachel's eyes because she found his overtures obnoxious and irritating. .

Erve and Edward are problematic types for two reasons: (1) they are not very attractive or likable, and (2) they are also handicapped by a lack of awareness or lack of character to the point that they are, in some situations, at least, unable to tell what a female would like. For the more insensitive types of unattractive males who cannot tell what a female wants, there is little chance of earning an attractive female's affection, admiration, and intimacy by treating her well.

Unattractive, insensitive males would not be a problem if they understood their situation and acted on that understanding, but they are often so "out of it" that they fail to understand their position. They act as though

they are attractive and capable of earning a female's admiration and affection. They hang around females who are more attractive than they are and are obnoxious because the female has to "put them off."

In both Study B and Study C, we found cases in which such names as *jerk, ass, asshole,* and *creep* were used as insults. In Study A, as well, respondents often indicated that these were insulting and derogatory names. It is now clear why this is the case: These names refer to types who are neither attractive nor adept at treating females well. They refer to men who are on the bottom of the prestige ranking; they are the least likely of males to earn females' admiration and affection. Their insensitivity makes them treat females as poorly as *jocks, Don Juans* and *egotists* are likely to do, but they do not have the redeeming quality of these latter types of being attractive in some way. Their prestige is especially low because they do not even know when they are disliked. They make "fools" of themselves by pursuing attractive females who are not at all interested in them. This factor of prestige is why Karen could not call Sam an "ass" and not look like a fool herself. By calling Sam an "ass," Karen would have been indicating that his prestige was low and that therefore it was unlikely he could earn the admiration of a female. Clearly, Sam did not have this problem. Not only was he known as a "big jock on campus," he was also at the party with a female.

MALES WHO HAVE (UNUSUAL) SEXUAL APPETITES

From the Study B interviews, we know that talking about the sexual aspects of one's current relationships is an indication of intimacy or closeness. Most of our informants did not feel close enough to us to discuss sex and sexuality in their own personal relationships. The ones who did discuss these topics in the interviews had moments of embarrassment, and even the very articulate ones had difficulty in finding words to describe their interpretations. Where sex and sexuality are talked about on a more impersonal level as a topic of conversation or as a target for joking, however, the informants were less reticent. The "horny" and "oversexed" person, for example, was caricatured even in our presence for comic effect.

Because of the informants' reticence and difficulty in talking about the aspects of their relationships that had to do with sex and sexuality, we have only a few in-depth accounts that present information relevant to informants' views on types of males who are problematic because they are sexually unusual or extraordinary. Because of this limitation, we include only one of the few relevant stories plus list a set of assumptions that have been pieced together from the data:

1. Males have a natural desire for sexual intimacy with females, and vice versa.
2. Besides desiring sexual intimacy for its own sake, males also want to demonstrate their sexuality.
3. It is the female's prerogative to decide the extent of sexual intimacy she has with a male.

4. As with affection, admiration, and other forms of intimacy, females are more prone to choose to be sexually intimate with a male if they find him attractive.

Males who have unusual sexual appetites are those who prefer to have intimacy with other males. Also unusual are heterosexual males who have an unnaturally high level of desire and/or a strong need to demonstrate their sexuality. These males are problematic in terms of the presupposed world of male/female relations because both types are likely to provide little prestige or intimacy to females. Homosexual males focus on males and, although they can be friends with females, they are not suitable romantic partners for females. They are, in fact, competitors for other males. Sexually aggressive heterosexual males are even more problematic. They are prone to treat females in an uncaring manner because sex or their sexuality is of foremost importance to them, not the female and her concerns. They may become overly focused on sex and disregard aspects of the female that are important to her own self-identity. Or, the attractive ones may take advantage of their attractiveness, accepting intimacy from a woman with no intent to treat her well. Or, they may make overtures that cause her to have to make decisions about intimacy before she is ready. Karla, for example, in describing a "pass" a man made at her on their second date, recounts how she assessed what she considered to be a fast invitation to intimacy:

Karla: I guess for about two weeks there, I was looking around for a surrogate for my old boyfriend. And [after this incident] I started looking on him as somebody who would be more of a challenge, someone who'd be kind of fun to play with because I realized this attitude which would lead him to ask me that sort of question on the second date would also make him rather interesting to deal with, and so I was not put off from dating him at all, I just realized that I'd have to be rather clever about it.

As Karla interprets it, males who have a strong sex drive or a high need to prove their sexuality are more of a challenge than males who do not. Relating to them is riskier because the pace is faster and more difficult to control than is the case in a normal relationship. Also, there is greater risk of being treated badly.

Summary of the cultural model of gender types

For American women, at least the ones in our samples, there is a standard, taken-for-granted way in which close male/female relationships – both romantic and friendship – come about. The male demonstrates his appreciation of the female's personal qualities and accomplishments by concerning himself with her needs and wants, and she, in turn, acts on her attraction to him by permitting a close, intimate relationship and by openly expressing her admiration and affection for him.

In the prototypical relationship, the two parties are equally attractive

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and equally attracted to one another. However, if the discrepancy in relative attractiveness is not too great, adjustments are possible. A relatively unattractive male can compensate for his lesser standing by making extraordinary efforts to treat the woman well and make her happy. A relatively unattractive female can compensate by scaling down her expectations of good treatment. When sufficient compensation is not in evidence or when the more attractive partner seems to be the one who is compensating, the relationship does not make sense and people say to one another: What does he see in her? or, Why does she put up with him?

Don Juans, turkeys, gays, and other types of males are singled out and talked about in relation to this taken-for-granted world of male/female relationships. These types have characteristics that lead them to cause problems for women. Attractive, popular males who are arrogant or self-centered, for example, take advantage of their attractiveness to women to gain affection and intimacy without intending to enact the friendship or romantic relationship that would normally follow mutual attraction in the taken-for-granted world. They treat the woman badly, which puts her in an uncomfortable position (like that of Annette) of being shown to be less attractive than the male. The woman has revealed her affection and admiration for the male with nothing to show in return.

In contrast to *Don Juan, jock,* or *chauvinist* types, there are the *jerks* and *nerds,* who are not adept at pleasing a female. Unattractive males of this type, the "losers," are particularly problematic because they often pursue a female who is more attractive than they are. Since they are not only unattractive but also inept at earning her affection by treating her well, they are engaged in a futile pursuit. Yet they hang around, impervious to her disinterest and unaware that she is more attractive than they. Eventually, they become obnoxious.

Sexually different males also create anomalies in the taken-for-granted world of male/female relationships. Both homosexual males and males who are heterosexual but overly focused on sexual activity render the meaning and value of physical or sexual intimacy between males and females problematic. Homosexual males do not want intimacy with females and therefore cannot be romantic partners for females. Relationships are a priori arrested at the level of friendship. Males who are overly sexually aggressive, on the other hand, force females to a decision about intimacy before the relationship has progressed very far. They are also unlikely to carry through with the relationship because for them there is less involvement with the female as an individual, a person.

Discussion

Two questions were posed at the beginning of the paper: What do Americans leave unspoken when they talk about gender types? and How is this implicit knowledge mentally organized? The preceding section sum-

marizes the implicit knowledge that the women in our samples take for granted about male/female relationships and about types of males who are likely to cause a relationship to go awry. Here, we outline the implications of our research for the cognitive organization of knowledge about gender types. The final section of the paper discusses the questions of the susceptibility of the cultural model to change and its likely distribution in the American population.

THE COGNITIVE ORGANIZATION OF CULTURAL KNOWLEDGE ABOUT GENDER TYPES

Our studies indicate that individual Americans understand talk about *jerks, wimps, he-men, chicks, broads,* and their behavior by thinking of these characters in relation to a taken-for-granted relationship between males and females. In the prototypical sequence of events described in detail in the previous section, a male and a female are attracted to one another and develop a close relationship in which they become friends and/or romantic/sexual partners. Cognitively associated with this taken-for-granted course of male/female relationships are scenarios of disruption in which one or another of the participants causes the relationship to abort or go awry. Most gender-marked types, it turns out, are types who cause such disruptions.

This organization of knowledge according to prototypic events and scenarios is not what we had originally anticipated. At the start of our study, as explained, we rejected the hypothesis that knowledge about gender types is cognitively organized as a list of definitions of *fox, doll, scag,* and so forth. We turned instead to an analysis of the cognitive structure or similarity structure of the set of types. Researchers customarily assume that this type of analysis, which is usually carried out with the aid of multidimensional scaling, identifies key attributes of a domain (e.g., gender types) and that these key attributes organize and orient people's thinking about the domain. Such an analysis presumes that knowledge about gender types is basically organized according to a set of attributes.

Our studies indicated, however, that such an approach was of limited utility for gender types. When the people in our sample were asked which types were similar, they did not perform this task by explicitly focusing on important attributes of the types. Rather, they related the types to a set of scenarios in which the prototypical male/female relationship is disrupted. We found, in other words, that respondents compared types of males and females according to their fit to scenarios. Furthermore, in order to explicate the scenarios, we found it necessary to consult additional data, from which we inferred the underlying taken-for-granted world of male/female relationships. The multidimensional scaling did assist us in identifying an important aspect of the cultural model, namely, the groupings of problematic types of males and females. Cognitive-structure analysis did not, however, provide us with a means of or a motiva-

tion for presenting the scenarios that seemed to be an integral part of our respondents' thinking about these different gender types. Nor did it provide us with the information about the taken-for-granted world we needed to understand the scenarios and their emotional poignancy. Nor did it prepare us for the description of scenes that respondents sometimes seemed to picture as a means of capturing the nature of the type.

Without knowledge of the scenarios, we would have been at a loss to explain why respondents thought some terms for gender types could be used as insults whereas others could not. The multidimensional scaling approach offered no indication why calling a male a "Don Juan" or a "playboy" or a "jock" or some other type who is likely to take advantage of a woman is usually not considered to be insulting whereas calling someone a "creep," a "turkey," a "jerk," or some other type of ineffectual male is. We had to learn more about the taken-for-granted world of male/female relationships to know that even though males who use their attractiveness to exploit women may be avoided because they are dangerous, they are not as low in prestige as males who are unlikable and ineffective. Males of the latter category are unattractive. A woman who refers to a male as an "asshole" is indicating that he is unattractive relative to herself. She is indicating that she finds him "beneath her." The same is not necessarily the case for a woman who refers to a male as a "Don Juan." She is not necessarily insulting him. Although she may avoid him for fear that he will take advantage of her, she is attesting to his attractiveness, and, in fact, may be admitting that he is more attractive than she is.

In a similar vein, the present analysis illuminates rather than obscures, as does cognitive-structure analysis, the implications of categorizing someone according to a gender type. As Boltanski and Thevenot (1983) have pointed out, social-classification systems are different from nonsocial classification systems because, in applying them, one is also classifying oneself. In typing a male, a female is typing others and herself. This reflexive quality of categorization by gender type is both explained by the cultural model and apparent from the scenarios that include both the male and the female. Relationships between males and females reflect on both parties because of the assumptions in the cultural model that attractive males will choose to be with attractive females, and vice versa, and that attractive females can expect better treatment from males than can less attractive females. To classify a male is to make claims about the male and implicitly about oneself and about other women who have a close relationship with him. In calling Donny a "jerk," the women on Diana's hall were doing more than saying something about Donny. They were saying that they would not put up with his behavior and that they would not be associated with him. Classifications reveal one's standards and sensitivities and therefore one's assessment of one's own attractiveness and claims to prestige.

In short, we argue that the cognitive organization of gender knowledge is insufficiently illuminated by an approach such as cognitive-structure analysis, which assumes that there is a set of key dimensions or attributes onto which sets of similar gender types are mapped. Our informants associate type names with a prototypic male/female relationship and with scenarios of interactions that they sometimes seem to visualize, not just attributes, as would be expected from cognitive-structure analysis. Furthermore, although people do know important attributes of the different gender types and can say which types are similar and which dissimilar, they also know more - a lot more. They have knowledge of a taken-for-granted world to which these types are relevant and thus they know how the various attributes are interrelated. They know not only that some gender names are insulting but also the basis for and the emotional intensity of the insult. Similarly, they appreciate the reflexivity of categorizing other people by these terms. It is possible that a neophyte (perhaps a child, an anthropologist, or a freshman) begins to learn gender types by memorizing what a cognitive-structure analysis reveals - similar types and their important attributes - but it is also likely that the neophyte would eventually infer the more fundamental parts of the cultural model. She would form an idea of the normal or prototypical course of male/female relationships and come to see the named gender types as actors in this prototypical world. She would go beyond the limited organization of knowledge revealed by the cognitive-structure analysis.

INERTIA OF THE CULTURAL MODEL

If our argument is valid and the cultural model does organize the extensive amount of knowledge that we claim it does, then the difficulties of radically altering the model become apparent. The world posited by this cultural model is simply taken for granted as the world to which new experiences are relevant. Not only are new males seen as participants in this world, but they are also seen as possible variations on the small number of problematic types already identified. Gathering information on each new male or female one meets is unnecessary; one need check for only a small number of characteristics. However, the price of this cognitive economy is a bit of rigidity in interpreting the world and a certain slowness in recognizing or learning new models.

Cognitive constraints are important forces for the inertia of the cultural model; even more important are the constraints that derive from the social nature of the model. Verbal descriptions of individuals as gender types are understood by listeners in light of the cultural model. Comments such as "Wearing your add-a-beads, eh?," are heard against the backdrop of the extensive implicit knowledge organized by the cultural model. Even new names for new types are interpreted according to this model; one guesses what the type is like - extensive explanation is unnecessary (Holland & Skinner 1985). The shared cultural model vastly facilitates communication; experiences can be rapidly communicated to other people if described according to the conventions of the cultural model. Again, however, economy has a price. It is easy to communicate about the familiar but

difficult to communicate about the unfamiliar. Even though it is certainly possible and perhaps even easy for some individuals to think up or recognize new gender types, communicating a concept of a truly new, radically different type of male or female to other people is a formidable task. Talk about types, new or old, is assumed to be talk that can be interpreted according to the cultural model. Even if the individual manages to think "outside" the cultural model (which may in fact happen quite frequently), he or she still will face considerable difficulty in communicating the alternative models to other people. Because it provides the backdrop for interpreting and the conventions for talking about experiences, the cultural model is a social entity not easily altered by a single individual.

Along these lines, one wonders if truly radical changes can be made in the model by the mere introduction of a new type, such as a *feminist,* or, as the men in our samples labeled the type, a "libber." Elaborating or introducing a new type is a relatively mild attack since the bedrock of the model, the taken-for-granted, prototypic relationship of males and females is, at best, challenged only indirectly and the new type is easily distorted to fit the existing model. Because the conventions for talking about females and males as types are so much an integral part of the cultural model described here, it is likely that totally new ways of talking about or describing or representing male/female relations may be an easier means through which to introduce new models of these relations. The essays of feminist social scientists, for example, or more likely the self-analysis talk learned in therapy could provide the new discourse genre.

THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE CULTURAL MODEL ACROSS SOCIAL SPACE AND HISTORICAL TIME

The samples consulted in this study can tell us little about the distribution of alternative cultural models of gender over time and across social groups in the United States. The samples were predominantly composed of respondents who are white, southern, and middle class. Furthermore, most of the Study B and Study C data come from women who are young and unmarried.

Young, unmarried women attending universities such as those where our studies were conducted are usually participants in a social system that is closer to what Coleman (1961) and others such as Schwartz (1972) and Eisenhart and Holland (1983) have associated with adolescence or youth than it is to adult society. This youth society emphasizes social identities based on gender and, to a lesser extent, social class. Much of youth culture is devoted to the elaboration of gender relationships and gender types (see Davidson 1984 and Holland & Eisenhart 1981 for further detail on the peer groups of the women in our samples). The importance of gender-marked social types such as those described in this paper, in other words, may be a function of the age of the group studied.

Similarly, the dynamics of attractiveness and intimacy posited by the cultural model may be particularly stressed in youth as opposed to adult culture. Once the women in our samples have married and had children and/or permanently joined the labor force, they perhaps will learn a different perspective on male behavior. A male's potential behavior in and contribution to a household economy and family relationships or his behavior in the workplace may become more important to these women than the male's potential for providing intimacy and proof of one's attractiveness as a woman. Yet, we are reluctant to assume that the cultural model of gender has no currency in the thinking and talking of participants in adult society. Our interviews with an albeit limited sample of older women suggest that the cultural model continues to be important in the interpretation of experiences that occur in the formation of friendship and (extra marital) romantic relationships with males and in the interpretation of certain relationships in the workplace. Males who systematically treat female co-workers differently from male co-workers are interpreted according to the cultural model described here.

Perhaps even more intriguing than the question of the distribution of the cultural model across age groups is its relevance to our samples' male counterparts. The cultural model of gender described may be "role-centric." Unlike scientific models, which are supposedly constructed from a detached perspective, the cultural model provides for the interpretation of males from the point of view of the female in a (potential) male/female relationship. It is also the case that when the women in our samples talk extensively about particular males, they are usually talking to other women. For these reasons, it might be expected that males' cultural models of gender could differ from that of the females and that males' models tend to take the perspective of the male in the relationship. Unfortunately, we lack in-depth interviews from the males and so have been restricted in our description of the males' perspective. The data from males in the Study A interviews do suggest, however, that males share with females a concern for attractiveness and intimacy although from a different vantage point. Complementary to females' concern about good treatment, for example, males are sensitive to their vulnerability to the demands of females; they worry about becoming involved with a female who is too demanding, too "bitchy."

FUNDAMENTALS OF SOCIAL CATEGORIZATION

In our study, we ignored the question of alternative models of gender that may exist in different age, class, ethnic, and regional groups in the United States because we were concerned with a prior question; namely: How do individuals cognitively grasp the cultural models that inform their talk about gender types? Our work is an answer, from the perspective of cognitive anthropology, to the question of which aspects of the cultural model of gender are fundamental, basic, and stable versus which aspects are superficial and likely to be transient. In general, the process of identi

fying a cultural model involves determining fundamental versus surface elements of the complex of beliefs and knowledge (see also Clement 1982). The distinction between fundamental and surface elements of a belief system, is, of course, a necessary precursor to meaningful cross-(sub)cultural comparison.

Because of the limited availability of comparable research on social types, it is unwise to anticipate future generalizations about the cognitive fundamentals of cultural models of social types. Recognizing the perils, however, we would speculate that the organization of cultural knowledge will be similar for other social types, at least in American culture, to what we have found in the case of gender. We suspect that the implicit knowledge that informs the talk of other subgroups about gender types and the talk of all groups about other social types such as types of children, or types of hospital patients, or general role terms as described in Burton and Romney (1975) and in Harding and Clement (1980), may all conform to the pattern we have noted in the American cultural model of gender types. We suspect that the type names refer either to roles (e.g., *boyfriend, fiancé, bachelor, date*) in the taken-for-granted world or, more likely, to styles of enacting these roles (e.g., *Don Juan, jerk, wimp*) that disrupt the prototypical course of the relationship to which they are relevant.[13] On the other hand, we seriously doubt that the content of the prototypic relationship and therefore the problematic social types will be the same from one culture to another.

Notes

1. Because this paper draws on three separate research projects, there are many people and agencies to thank. First are the many individuals who participated in the studies as respondents, as informants, and as interviewers. Second, several sources of funds made it possible to collect and analyze a large amount of data: a grant from the National Institute of Education (NIE-G-79-0108), a National Research Service Award (1-F32-MH08385-01), grants from the University Research Council of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (1-0-101-3284-VP376, 1-0-101-3284-VP497), and a Kenan leave from UNC. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Princeton Conference on Folk Models; comments made by conference participants were extremely helpful. A version was also read in the departmental colloquium series at the University of North Carolina. Thanks go to the insightful comments of participants at that colloquium as well as to a helpful critique by Luc Boltanski.
2. Because the samples in Studies B and C (described below) included only two males, the paper focuses on women's perspectives of men.
3. Holland's pre-1982 publications are under the name of Clement.
4. The Ixil have suffered serious hardship and decimation in the recent and currently on-going government reprisals in Guatemala. As a result, the cultural and social systems of the Ixil have changed considerably since these data were collected (B. N. Colby, personal communication).

5. We selected types that were mentioned frequently. Otherwise, we attempted to include a wide range of types.
6. The codes indicate the following: The first two digits are unique identifiers for each respondent. The third digit refers to age, with code "3" indicating 18 to 25 year-olds. Codes "4" and above are older. A code of "1" in the fourth digit indicates a female respondent.

    The respondents for the A-1 interviews included 13 females aged 18 to 25 and 13 females who were 40 or older. The corresponding figures for the male respondents were 8 and 8, respectively. For the second interview, all the respondents, 16 males and 26 females, were all between the ages of 18 and 25. All the respondents were residing in North Carolina at the time of the interview. The implications of the sample limitations are discussed below.
7. In the A-1 interviews, respondents described one gender type at a time. In the A-2 interviews, the sorting interviews, they described the grouping of types they had formed.
8. From the sorting data, we calculated similarity measures among all pairs of items using the formula suggested by Burton (1975). These similarities measures were then analyzed using a nonmetric multidimensional scaling program developed by Kruskal (1964a; 1964b) as modified by Napior.
9. Since completing the present paper, we have tested our ability to predict reactions to types not included in our A-2 interviews and to types whose names we created. Our predictions, which were based on the cultural model described in this paper and on conventions we had noted in the names for the types, were largely borne out (Holland & Skinner 1985).
10. In some cases, the description is not about the type of person to which the term refers, but rather is about a type of person who would use such a term or the kind of situation in which the term would be used:

    1231 [*buck, macho, stud, chauvinist, egotist, bastard, prick, hunk, Don Juan, playboy*] what a female chauvinist pig would think of males - stereotypical attitudes.

    (cm Case 6 in Fillmore 1982:34)

    Another example of this kind of assessment was given by a local professional who looked over the names collected in Study A-1. He said his clients would be disdainful of the terms we had been given for homosexuals. He summarized their opinion in a retort, "Only a wimp would call a fag, a 'gay.'"
11. All names are pseudonyms. Furthermore, a few details from the passages have been changed to protect the anonymity of the informants.
12. In the campus cultures of the two universities where these studies were carried out, one big source of prestige for males is participation in athletics, particularly on the University varsity squads.
13. Marilyn Strathern's (personal communication 1984) observations of the Hagen of New Guinea must be noted as a possible counterexample. Hagen males talk about females as gender-marked types, but they do so in the context of exchange and transaction, not in the context of interpreting problematic behavior in a cross-gender interpersonal situation.

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