

4. A Functional View of Value Ultimates

This full-length article was presented at Columbia University, probably before the Philosophy Club, but it was never published. Locke published philosophy articles on the rare occasions that he was asked to contribute a written article. This article was written, I suspect, as a part of Locke's long-standing effort to secure a teaching position in New York that would allow him to take a year's leave of absence from Howard.

Unlike "Pluralism and Ideological Peace," published in 1947 and written in commemoration of Horace Kallen and honoring cultural pluralism, "A Functional View of Value Ultimates" provides both a sustained argument and indications of Locke's view of social utility. However, it was not finished by Locke for the purpose of publication and should be read with that in mind.

A metaphorical fallacy exists, on Locke's account, when absolutists argue for value ultimates. They take formal values as fixed (truth, beauty, virtue, etc.) when they are in fact always ensconced and encoded in a process of relational meanings. Value ultimates or imperatives are really "system imperatives rather than intrinsic absolutes." Values are functional transpositional systems.

Locke explains that the process of continual transvaluation of values is not only central to what

"A Functional View of Value Ultimates," read at Columbia University, December 13, 1945, unpublished. Printed with the permission of Moorland-Spangarn Research Center, Alain Locke Collection, Howard University.

humans are but has positive consequences. It does not, in effect, leave us in a world without the possibility of criteria for judging or preferring a set of values. Locke contends that changes in values and social norms tend to be progressively corrective. He rejects the possibility of an eternally warranted or fixed set of values or norms. Rather, understanding how values function is a pivotal requirement that should precondition considerations of which regulative normative rules we adopt.

In my opinion, Locke intentionally prefers here, as well as in other articles, a notion of functionalism to depict values rather than a pragmatic depiction. The functionality of values implies for Locke that values are manifest in the operation of material interests or social conventions to accomplish some goal. They are never completely available to us, and a useful method of reasoning may be pragmatic, exegetical, dialectic, or intuitive—that is, no privilege is *a priori* accorded. A pragmatic depiction of values, however, implies that values are tools, foreign instruments, or contrived methods used to accomplish some goal. In this sense, pragmatic values are goods that stand, like a hammer, outside of us, but the notion of functional values allows us to conceive of values as being always integral to our deliberations, actions, and goals. Like one sense of James's and Dewey's understanding of "pragmatism," the word "functional" both depicts what values are and recommends a reasoning modality. However, Locke does not intend "functional" to privilege experimental science as a model of reasoning.

A Functional View of Value Ultimates

Quite patently, the core problem in theory of value is the satisfactory explanation of the formal value ultimates, such as beauty, truth and goodness. Since this has been a perennial question from the very beginning of axiological theorizing, it is a matter of concern, if not of reproach that so little agreement has been reached concerning the nature of the basic value norms. Reasons for this require at least passing consideration. One reason, certainly, is that value theorists have concerned themselves far too much with abstract consideration of their nature as formal norms, and far too little with their specific functional relationships to the values and value situations which they serve as terminal references and evaluative criteria. But in addition, as Urban¹ correctly states, "the field of axiology has been defined largely in relation to ethics." Now not only is ethics traditionally the most categorical and authoritarian of the value fields, leading naturally to an emphasis on solution by definition, but any over-emphasis on the separate consideration of value norms rather than an analysis of their interrelationships leads also, just as inevitably to formalistic analysis, often of the dogmatic variety. I confess at the outset to a preference for a functionalist theory of value, but my brief for a functional analysis of value norms is at least on the methodological side not completely *parti pris*, but is made rather because a functional approach, even should it lead to a non-functional theory of value, of necessity treats the value varieties in terms of their interrelationships, guaranteeing a comparative approach and a more realistic type of value analysis.

Indeed, the most illuminating evidence as to the nature of the value genres and their systematic end values promises to come from the examination of parallelisms in their functioning, as well as from case analyses of their occasional overlapping and interchangeability. A functional analysis of values focuses particularly on such phenomena of their selective normativity, also upon the tricky but revelatory phenomena of what Ehrenfels called "value movement" and value change. This wide field of comparative and differential analysis of values should all along have been a major emphasis in value theory, as seems to have been intended by the pioneer axiologists in their demand for a *general* psychology of value. But value formalism has, it seems, deprived of this. Formalism in value theory, moreover,

leads so easily to value fundamentalism and its dogmatisms. Many current value theories are in substance extensions of preformulated epistemologies and already adopted metaphysical positions, with a projection of these into a theory of value as a new set of weapons to be used in the traditional warfare of ideologies. On such grounds, it seems wise, therefore, to canvas the possibilities of the functional approach to the problem of value ultimates.

In so doing, we become immediately aware that there are two sets of problems involved which should perhaps not be uncoupled in spite of the risks of lumping problems and confusing the issues involved. Naturally, the normal analytic procedure of philosophers usually separates them as a matter of routine. One set of problems is on the theoretical level, and involves the formal definition of the generic character of the value ultimates: the other set of problems is on the practical level and concerns the active issues of value conflict in our culture and their bearing on the questions of value ultimacy. The functional approach, consistently carried out, is methodologically obligated, I believe, not to uncouple the theoretical from such practical aspects of the value problem, and may eventually find its best leads and most satisfactory solutions coming by way of an insistence on such correlation. Detailed study of the issues of value conflict and the explanation of changing content in even our most stable normative concepts have direct bearing upon the character and scope of our value ultimates. On this point, we must never overlook the significant historical fact that it was Nietzsche's provocative raising of the question of the "transvaluation of values" that inaugurated modern value theory by precipitating the basic question of the ultimacy of our traditional values. But there are also pressing contemporary reasons for this approach in the crucial current problems of value conflict both within and between our contemporary cultures, a situation which seems to verify Nietzsche's diagnosis of our era as a time of unprecedented value crisis.

Value theory was originally expected to provide some basis for the critical and comparative study of our basic values and value systems, but has as yet not fulfilled such expectations, largely, one repeats, on account of its value theory's dominant and chronic formalism. In a time of ideological stress and storm, which is symptomatic of value conflict, any prospect of an adequate value critique should be espe-

cially explored and eagerly developed. A functional consideration of values, certainly, heads squarely into such issues and problems, with little chance of avoiding their full impact: that is its good or bad fortune according to its success or failure in handling them. This paper merely attempts to justify the potentialities of such an approach without the further presumption of attempting in constructive outline, an entire functionalist theory of value.

One question, however, must be settled favorably before a functional analysis of the normative element in so-called value "ultimates" can assure itself of safe clearance. That is an adequate answer to the contention of the value realists that functional value analysis can only yield a descriptive account of value assertions and cannot, therefore, account for their normative character or their role in evaluative judgment. The most outspoken form of this argument regards all varieties of value functionalism as merely attenuated forms of the extremist position in value relativism, logical positivism, and reducible to it in final analysis on the presumption that they deny by implication what positivism denies explicitly, *viz.*, the basic normative property of values. An example of such criticism is Urban's quite categorical statement, "It is coming to be seen that there is no middle ground between this positivism and some form of objective axiology," going on to add: "Many, it is true, have sought such a middle ground in pragmatism, with its quasi-objectivity and its instrumental notion of verification. But it is becoming increasingly clear that such a position is untenable."²

Such a reduction of the position of all value functionalism to the ultra-relativism of the positivists is arbitrary and unwarranted. Granted that some relativist interpretations of value are so subjective as to be completely atomistic and anarchistic, that is not the case with all. Particularly is this so with a type of analysis whose main objective is to give a consistent account of the relative permanencies of value-modes and their normative criteria *and* the readily observable phenomena of value change and value transposition in a way that they will not contradict one another.

Value content is observably variable and transposable with regard to its value norms. There is no warrant of fact for considering values as fixed permanently to certain normative categories or pegged in position under them or attached intrinsically by nature or "essence"

to that mode of valuation to which they may be relevantly referred. Only in our traditional stereotyping of values is this so: in actuality, something in the way they are felt or apprehended establishes their normative relevancy. On this point, it may well turn out that some psychological coerciveness in value feeling or some dispositional role or cue in behavior is an adequate and more verifiable explanation of the relation between the particular value and its referential "ultimate" or norm.

It is, moreover, an oversimplification of the form of relativism under discussion, functional relativism, to say that it merely calls to our attention that what is good today is bad tomorrow [or vice versa]. This interpretation of value is more properly represented by a statement that what is revealed or developed in experience as *better* becomes *the new good*, shifting to the position of normative acceptance or urgency formerly occupied by the older value content. The process continuity of the normative character of values is demonstrated not merely by the substitution of new value content for the old, but even more clearly by the displacement and retroactive devaluing of the old, a procedure which transforms yesterday's good into a relatively bad. That which is felt or judged as relatively better (or truer to the systematic value quality in the case of other types of value than the ethical) is normally preferred and so becomes normatively imperative. When explicit judgment ensues, it is revamped in evaluative thought accordingly.

To my way of construing the situation, it is the retrospective revaluation of the value which, by guaranteeing the stability of the norm and the value system it supports exhibits most clearly the really functional force and character of the normative principle. Paradoxically, in actual practise, it seems to be the progressively corrective character of the value norm more than stability of specific value content which endows our abstract values with normative ultimacy. It is by such a criterion, for example, that we can best explain why a lesser evil becomes a comparative good.

There are, of course, value situations where this functionally normative reaction is lacking, but on close scrutiny they turn out to be situations which even as exceptions prove the rule. For they are situations where the inhibitions and dogmatisms of habit block the corrective revision of the value content. In such cases either the in-

telligence or feeling or both, entrenched in irrational fixation on the orthodox content, refuses to follow through, and invariably does so by the technique of asserting an inseparable connection between the value form and its value content. I have elsewhere in greater detail³ attempted to characterize value norms as system values rather than fixed intrinsic values, as process imperatives rather than intrinsic absolutes.

The most effective reply, however, to value realism's rejection of this functionalist interpretation is to challenge the value realist under his presuppositions to explain, in addition to such value change as has just been cited, the numerous observable cases of value transposition. For instance, a demonstration or proof, normally logical in value reverence and criterion, is appraised, because of its virtuosity or style of proof as "neat," "pretty," "elegant" or even "beautiful." Unless this type of value occurrence is illusory or mere metaphorical confusion in the language of value description, it presents an almost unexplainable character to the value realist. If he is consistent with his doctrine of the value type as intrinsic, he must dismiss such situations as mere analogies. But inside acquaintance with the experience shows it to be in the case mentioned to be a genuinely aesthetic value reference both in its valuational and evaluational phases, vested with the characteristic attitudes, feelings and judgment of the aesthetic norm rather than just a metaphorical transfer of aesthetic predicates. It actually becomes an aesthetic value *qua* something admired for its perfection of form and the contemplative satisfaction which this admiration of it yields. Formalizations of values, traditional in attitude association or orthodox in logical evaluation, do stereotype certain content with value references that become typical and characteristic; but there are not only many exceptions in actual valuation but in all specific cases, where the value attitude as experienced or felt is that appropriate to another value-genre, the value reference and judgment as indicated qualitatively by the descriptive predicates, however unorthodox the reference, follow, it seems, the actualities of the value attitude.

On the other hand, the value realist's reasoning, in addition to being an inadequate explanation of the real situation, in its form of thinking would seem to involve another instance of what Reiser aptly calls the "inveterate tendency to make entities out of modes

of behavior.”⁴ Certainly this value objectification upon an intrinsic basis exhibits *usteron proteron* reasoning by reversing the natural order of the value and its content reference, as though the discrimination of the value led to the discovery of the “true” nature of the object, rather than realizing that the valuing of the object in a certain way leads to its apprehension in a certain value context. Ehrenfels has a pithy analysis of such fallaciousness: “Philosophy itself,” he says, “at the beginning followed this urge for objectification which transfers the content of the inner experience to the thing itself as absolutely determinant, endeavoring thus to discover that which had *value in itself*, with about as much justification [he shrewdly adds] as one might claim in contending whether the direction toward the north pole or that toward the south pole pointed upwards in itself, or whether the earth by itself was a large or small body.”⁵ This, I take it, is both an apt description and refutation of the classic fallacy involved in the value absolutist’s position. From the functionalist’s point of view the basic error lies in regarding the formal value as the cause of the valuation or as an essence of the value object rather than the system value of the mode of valuing, which is sometimes the symbol, sometimes its rationale, but in practise an implementation of the value as apprehended. Of course, to the degree that values are regarded abstractly, they take on a quality of universality and seeming independence, but this is merely a common characteristic of all generalizations. But if we can sufficiently explain the character of value-generals as system norms, functional in value discrimination and comparison, they need not then be unrealistically raised to the status of hypostasized absolutes or perennial essences.

At this point it becomes quite proper to leave behind formal counterargument of opposing views, and turn to the more concrete and congenial consideration of concrete cases, functionally interpreted. Time will permit only a single example from each of the major value-genres, the moral, the logical and the aesthetic, each instance selected to illustrate what we may call the contextual basis of the normative character involved. Each case, involving as it does value change and the displacement of older traditional material by new value content, ought to exhibit the type of relative normativity of the kind we have been delineating, that is, flexible as to material content permitting value change and reconstruction but nonetheless systematic and normatively coercive in its function of value control.

As a case illustrating several important facets of functional relativism in moral values, I choose a profoundly analytic value problem propounded in a play by the Soviet dramatist, Korneichuk, I believe, which deeply impressed me when I saw it some years ago. I think he made out a clear case for the contextual but systematic character of normative value control. He was enabled to do so because he chose a situation involving a complete reversal of value for the same act, but showed how though diametrically opposed one to the other, as between the two systems of values, each was imperatively right in the context of its own appropriate system. By taking an act that most of us find impossible to imagine out of our orthodox context of the greatest of all evils and crimes, Korneichuk dramatically and illuminatingly sets the action and conflict in a setting where the greatest of crimes is not only a virtue but a sacrosanct duty. The act is parricide, and the setting is the changing life of a nomadic Eskimo tribe making their first sustained contact with Western civilization and its moral codes.

Age-old custom, on the very reasonable basis of the peculiar uselessness of the old and feeble in the hazardous life of a nomadic Arctic people, has decreed the custom of ritualistic parricide, with the eldest son obligated by custom to push the aged parent off into the sea from an icefloe after a feast in which both the shaman and the aged victim give ritualistic consent. The hero of the play, however, has been away at a Soviet training center and has been exposed to another code in terms of which pardonable parricide has become unpardonable murder, and in addition functionally unnecessary. Returning, he is in general conflict with the tribal values, but has been taught to minimize the impact of the conflict with understanding tolerance and piecemeal reform. But peace cannot be made on that basis with the shaman who represents the unyielding authority of the old system as a whole. The shaman's moment inevitably comes when the time arrives for the father's custom sanctioned death, for at that point the two systems meet in irreconcilable contradiction.

The dramatist has carefully and sympathetically conveyed the imperative logic of the older value system which makes parricide acceptable to the aged parent and a filial duty expected of his son. Though an obsolescent way of life, with its justifying function gone, the old value is presented, correctly, I think, as "right" on its own level, that is, in the mind of the father and the relatives. As he vac-

illates between the two loyalties, the son's hesitancy and grief over the tragic dilemma emotionally concedes this; at several moments he is pictured as about to perform what to him is a crime but to the others a dutiful favor. But the reappearance of the shaman reinstates the duel between the systems, and it is clear that from that point on the son will never concede in action. The old man, still convinced of the rightness of his going, shocked by his son's hesitancy and yet dimly aware of the new set of values which hinder him, walks off into the sea without benefit of ceremony. The effective dramatization at one and the same time of the respective truths in conflict and of the value system principle as the root of the coercive normativeness of each affords deep insight into the nature of the functional normativity we are discussing. It is an exemplary instance of functional normativity, and one calculated to disprove the value formalist's charge of the non-normative character of the functionalist value interpretation.

The case example for logical values is taken deliberately from scientific theory rather than abstract logic, because although the same principle of systematic consistency is the functioning norm, the scientific example, in addition, will point up the fact that modern scientific theory has fully accepted the relativistic criterion of truth as its normative methodological criterion. It is now a commonplace that science at any given time acknowledges a final truth only in the sense of the most recently accepted consensus of competent experience, and contrary to traditional logic, knows no absolute or irreplaceable truth. Almost any of the larger general theories in science could equally well be taken as illustration of this. But I take the electron theory as most convenient to show in addition to the superiority of the electronic view of the atom as an explanatory concept for the observed behavior of matter, its greater normative range and force as a concept of greater systematic consistency and coverage than the older theory which it has displaced. As von Mach pointed out long ago, we realize that the extension of the system coverage of a theoretical truth is an important factor in its preferability as a theoretical satisfactory and acceptable explanation. As such, the proper interpretation would seem to be to regard this criterion as an evaluative form principle with a normative validity which is functionally based and attested.

But to turn more directly to the problem at hand, no physicist accepting the electronic view would style the older classical theory of the atom as false in its entirety but only in certain of its aspects. Indeed for a long period it was quite satisfactory as a consistent explanation of the nature of matter. However, until radically revised, it was not satisfactory or consistent as an interpretation of matter as energy. The electron theory is, therefore, a *truer* theory of the atom, and I stress *truer*, because, occupying the same relative position in the systematic analytical explanation of matter, it consistently includes and interprets more observable phenomena than the older atomic theory. For in addition to what it explained before—qualitative description and identification, serial position and relative weight and valence—it now also explains energy structure and energy potential. But the main point is that the new truth incorporates, on the basis of consistency, a good part of the previous theory, although perforce, also in the interest of consistency it has to discard certain other theoretically postulated properties now inconsistent with the enlarged range of known facts. Instrumental logic regards it as important to point out that, though now false, these elements were acceptable and useful in their context and time, and led up to the interpretations we now have substituted for general acceptance.

We should notice that important aspects of the present theory are hypothetical, and are regarded as true because of their systematic value in the explanation of the facts. Some of these items are just as hypothetical as the displaced and discredited elements in the older theory, but their present acceptability is based on the restored consistency, the wider coverage and the greater inclusiveness of the theoretical system as now conceived. The functionally normative character, in contradistinction to a permanent and intrinsic view of the nature of the truth value seems obvious, and this example is typical. A functionally based or relative ultimacy is all that is required, and more than that, at least in scientific procedures is definitely preferable.

Our value judgments in art, though none the less critical today and certainly more technical than ever, are also far from the traditionalism of the older aesthetics. Modern art theory and practise have broken almost completely with the former authoritarian conception of beauty. Indeed, on both the consumer and the productive

or creative level, we have actually witnessed in less than a generation the basic criteria of a major value mode going completely relativistic with regard to styles, idioms, art rationales and judgmental evaluation. Creative expression in modern art has particularly operated on radically extended canons of beauty and its appreciation. There are those, I am aware, who will say that art expression today has become so utterly relativistic that there is no longer a standard of beauty left or a valid set of stylistic criteria. But impartial examination of modern art will show rather contrary results. The widening of the variety of styles and aesthetic has actually been accompanied by a deepening of aesthetic taste and a sharpening of critical discrimination.

Certainly normative control has not been lost or sacrificed, as is proved by a double line of evidence. In the first place the appreciation of new forms and varieties has not caused us to lose grasp on our appreciation of the older varieties, the classical heritage of past artistic expression. Indeed, on the contrary, modernist art has never in its best expressions undermined the appreciation of traditional art. In the second place, critical discrimination as tested by genuine knowledge appreciation of the technical aspects of art styles has increased manyfold. Variety, on the whole, has not led to greater confusion, but by actual comparisons, critical taste and judgment have improved. Our current art pluralism is attested by the contemporary tolerance of many mutually incompatible styles, whose growth has been accompanied by a growing liberation of taste from formalism and superficially imposed standards, as concrete examples will show.

The musical formalist or aesthetic authoritarian has to confess his inability to judge the contemporary musical situation and usage. But the modernist, who is a sub-conscious or semi-conscious relativist, finds little or no difficulty in interpreting what has actually happened in modern art. In music, for example, what has the modern composer done? He has changed musical content substantially, but instead of destroying the musical norm has really enlarged its scope. He has not changed, in fact is not able to change the basic attitudinal qualities of musical apprehension nor has he broken down its discriminatory effectiveness. His new forms have developed critical criteria appropriate to their idiom and at the same time not inconsistent with the older criteria after habituation. What the modernist styles have done is really, by conditioning, to enlarge both by bring-

ing them into the orbit of the same favorable aesthetic reaction. The new style and idiom—certainly it is not our hearing but our appreciative apprehension which has improved—has succeeded in bringing into the realm of immediately felt concordance what was previously felt as irregular and cacophonous, and could not, therefore, be apprehended pleasurably and integrated into an aesthetically toned reaction.

A person who cannot, however, synthesize his auditory and emotional experiences on hearing Stravinsky or Hindemith cannot appreciate the musical language of modernist music. He can realize the technical musicianship and also concede its potential musicality for those who can genuinely appreciate it. But that same person can by repeated exposure to such music bring it not only within the range of appreciation but within now enlarged criteria of evaluative judgment, as good, bad or mediocre of its kind. The cacophony by repeated experience has become concordant, meaningful and therefore "beautiful." Now the illuminating aspect of this is that Stravinsky and Hindemith have not to such a matured taste upset the approach to and the appreciation of Mozart and Beethoven; nor for that matter has jazz upset the apprehension of classical musical forms and idioms, except temporarily. One hastens to add good jazz, which has developed for jazz idioms and forms more and more professionalized devotees and rigidly normative criteria of taste and critical musical analysis.

We may cite, quite briefly, the same sequence of results in another phase of art, painting and sculpture. In these forms, too, modernist art at first acquaintance seems a welter of uncoordinated styles and their rival aesthetics. But the anarchy is in large part illusory. Modern art has about solved the problem of art tolerance, by making each style a systematic criterion for itself and whatever is relevant to it. More than that both creative activity and appreciation have broadened base perceptibly. Modern art creativity may not be as Alpine as it was in certain periods of the past, but there is undeniably a higher plateau of appreciation and performance.

Incidentally this widening of the range of appreciation and participation is as good an example as we can find of what democratization can mean in a value field. First our exposure to Oriental art with its markedly different idioms and form criteria inaugurated the artistic

value revolution we call modernism. The appreciative understanding and creative use of the formerly strange and to us unaesthetic idioms of African and other primitive art followed, and a revolutionary revision of taste and creative outlook was fully on.

Since then, with ever-increasing experimentalism, art forms have been multiplied and taste extended. But here again in this field, as in music, modernistic relativism has not served to invalidate but rather to enhance the appreciation of the classical and traditional expressions of the beautiful.

Certainly this is a good augury for the resolution of certain hitherto irresolvable types of value conflict. I merely throw out the suggestion that through modernism and its enforced but not normatively chaotic relativism we have forged a psychological key for the active and simultaneous appreciation of diverse styles within our own culture, in fact within our own culture period. It seems to serve for the wider but none the less vivid appreciative understanding of alien art forms and idioms, and to give us some insight into their correlated aesthetics. Already through such enlargement we are able to appreciate a good measure of primitive art of all varieties, children's art and the art forms of many cultures that were dead letters to our eyes previously. In an approaching world interchange of culture it is just such widening of taste to a cosmopolitan range and level which seems most desirable, if indeed not imperative. That accents what has previously been mentioned, the functional superiority in explicit terms of improved comprehension of values and their more effective correlation as a direct consequence of relativistic as over against authoritarian approaches to the sets of values involved. If this is extendable to other value fields, and I think it is, we have in this principle of analysis and rearrangement an effective base for resolving large segments of our current value conflicts.

Instrumentalism or functionalism as I prefer to stress it has already pointed out that scientific knowledge operates on the methodological postulates of relativism and the constant revision of a progressively organized body of systematized experience. Art, we have just seen, in its contemporary theory and practise of values has moved in a similar direction, without losing hold on normative criteria that are effective and functional, though not arbitrarily static and absolute. We would do well to remember that both science and art once had doctrines

of the finality of beauty and truth, but have been able to abandon them. Absolutism, however, with its corollary of fundamentalism is still fairly generally entrenched in moral theory, in goodly measure still in speculative philosophy and in the orthodox varieties of religious faith and belief. The continuation of the older tradition of absolutism is, of course, closely bound in with the question of the nature of value ultimates and the type of normativeness they are supposed to exercise. This was our starting point. We come back to it to suggest that the more tenable interpretations of value theory as to the actually functioning of value norms aligns value theory on the side of the relativist position. Should that be true, value theory in the next steps of its development may exert the deciding influence among the value disciplines in turning away from absolutism and dogmatism on the one hand and relativism of the revisionist and progressive stripe on the other. Having become accommodated to a progressive truth and an ever-expanding and creatively exploratory quest for beauty, it may be that we shall trend toward a relativistic but not anarchic ethics, world view and religion which will be more functionally correlated with the actualities of life and conduct and more effectively normative without rigidly imposed and dictatorial authority. Our value ultimates from that point of definition and enforcement will no longer be unrealistic as principles and from the cultural point of view provincial tyrants.

NOTES

1. Wilbur Urban, "Axiology," in D. Runes (ed.), *Twentieth Century Philosophy*, p. 54.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 62.

3. Alain Locke, "Values and Imperatives," in Sidney Hook and Horace M. Kallen (eds.), *American Philosophy Today and Tomorrow* (New York: Lee Furman, 1935), p. 313.

4. Oliver L. Reiser, *The Promise of Scientific Humanism: Toward a Unification of Scientific, Religious, Social, and Economic Thought* (New York: D. Piess, 1940), p. 123.

5. C. F. von Ehrenfels, "Werttheorie und Ethik," *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie* 17 (1893), p. 87. [In the original Locke noted Volume 1; however, the reference seems to be to Volume 17.]

THE
PHILOSOPHY OF
ALAIN LOCKE
Harlem Renaissance
and Beyond

Edited by
LEONARD HARRIS



TEMPLE UNIVERSITY PRESS
Philadelphia