

## 2. Pluralism and Intellectual Democracy

The Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion was one of many organizational efforts by cultural pluralists between the 1920s and 1950s to discuss the similarities and differences of ethnic groups. The massive migration of peoples from Europe to the United States shortly before and after World War I, and again before and after World War II, occasioned a reassessment of the American identity, the rights of immigrants, and the value of a multicultural society. Locke participated in all of the conferences, chairing the fourth conference in the series. Lyman Bryson, Louis Finkelstein, and R. M. MacIver were the primary organizers of the series.

In this article, Locke intends to foil "tyrannies of authoritarian dogmatism and uniformitarian universality." By uniformitarian universality he means a system of beliefs purporting to convey necessarily true propositions and holding that such truths should be held by, or otherwise imposed on, all persons. The notion applies to both a philosophical position and the political reality of totalitarian states. How value relativism combats such systems frames his discussion. He employs William James's legacy by applauding James's role as a philosopher engaged in a battle against dogmatism and intellectual or metaphysical absolutism. But he rejects James's "anarchic" pluralist picture of experience.

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Locke recommends naturalizing epistemology. By so doing, a rapprochement between empiricism and rationalism would be possible. He affirms the existence of "functional constraints"—that is, universal values characteristically exhibited by all persons. One of those constraints or constants, that all values are endogenous, can be used to help warrant democratic principles of cultural tolerance and reciprocity. Tolerance and reciprocity have at best been ideals. Recognizing that loyalty to traditions is tenacious, Locke suggests relativism as a way of recognizing that our loyalties are historically situated and not objectively given. Tolerance and reciprocity are thereby recommended as mediating imperatives. Moreover, relativism suggests that we distinguish form from symbol and the values so attached, for example, distinguishing the institution from whether there is the reality of democracy. Locke tells his readers that American institutions are not the *sine qua non* of democracy. They are the symbols that have been mistaken for the form and value or worth attached to them as if they are the only means empowered to convey the form. Locke discusses the ways that an appropriate systematic value relativism and cultural pluralism foster attitudes compatible with democracy.

## Pluralism and Intellectual Democracy

When William James inaugurated his all-out campaign against intellectual absolutism, though radical empiricism and pragmatism were his shield and buckler, his trusty right-arm sword, we should remember, was pluralism. He even went so far as to hint, in a way that his generation was not prepared to understand, at a vital connection between pluralism and democracy. Today, in our present culture crisis, it is both timely to recall this, and important, for several reasons, to ponder over it.

In the first place, absolutism has come forward again in new and formidable guise, social and political forms of it, with their associated intellectual tyrannies of authoritarian dogmatism and uniformitarian universality. We are warrantably alarmed to see these vigorous, new secular absolutisms added to the older, waning metaphysical and doctrinal ones to which we had become somewhat inured and from which, through science and the scientific spirit, we acquired some degree of immunity. Though alarmed, we do not always realize the extent to which these modern Frankensteins are the spawn of the older absolutistic breeds, or the degree to which they are inherent strains, so to speak, in the germ plasm of our culture.

In the second place, in the zeal of culture defense, in the effort to bring about the rapprochement of a united front, we do not always stop to envisage the danger and inconsistency of a fresh crisis uniformitarianism of our own. There exists, fortunately, a sounder and more permanent alternative, the possibility of a type of agreement such as may stem from a pluralistic base. Agreement of this common denominator type would, accordingly, provide a flexible, more democratic nexus, a unity in diversity rather than another counter-uniformitarianism.

Third, we should realize that the cure radical empiricism proposed for intellectual absolutism was stultified when it, itself, became arbitrary and dogmatic. With its later variants—behaviorism, positivism, and what not—it fell increasingly into the hands of the empirical monists, who, in the cause of scientific objectivity, squeezed values and ideals out completely in a fanatical cult of "fact." Not all the recalcitrance, therefore, was on the side of those disciplines and doc-

trines, which, being concerned with the vital interests of "value" as contrasted with "fact," are after all functionally vital in our intellectual life and tradition. Today, we are more ready to recognize them and concede these value considerations a place, though not necessarily to recognize or condone them in the arbitrary and authoritarian guise they still too often assume.

In this connection, it is encouraging to see empiricism abdicating some of its former arbitrary hardness and toning down its intransigent attitudes toward the more traditional value disciplines. This is a wise and potentially profitable concession on the part of science to the elder sisters, philosophy and religion, especially if it can be made the *quid pro quo* of their renunciation, in turn, of their dogmatic absolutisms. The admirable paper of Professor Morris, prepared for this conference, does just this, I think, by redefining a more liberal and humane empiricism, which not only recognizes "values," but provides, on the basis of sound reservations as to the basic primacy of factual knowledge, for reconcilable supplementations of our knowledge of fact by value interpretations and even by value systems and creeds. This reverses the previous tactic of empiricists to deny any validity to values and so to create a hopeless divide between the sciences of fact and the value disciplines. Here again, in this more liberal empiricism, pluralism, and particularly value pluralism, has a sound and broadly acceptable basis of rapprochement to offer. Such rapprochement being one of the main objectives as well as one of the crucial problems of this conference, it is perhaps relevant to propose the consideration of pluralism as a working base and solution for this problem. This would be all the more justified if it could be shown that pluralism was a proper and congenial rationale for intellectual democracy.

James, pluralistically tempered, did not take the position, it is interesting to note, which many of his followers have taken. He did propose giving up for good and all the "game of metaphysics" and the "false" and categorical rationalizing of values, but he did not advocate sterilizing the "will to believe" or abandoning the search for pragmatic sanctions for our values. As Horace Kallen aptly states it,

James insisted that each event of experience must be acknowledged for what it appears to be, and heard for its own claims. To neither doubt nor belief,

datum nor preference, term nor relation, value nor fact, did he concede superiority over the others. . . . He pointed out to the rationalist the coordinate presence in experience of so much more than reason; he called the monist's attention to the world's diversity; the pluralist's to its unity. He said to the materialist: You shall not shut your eyes to the immaterial; to the spiritualist: You shall take cognizance also of the nonspiritual. He was a rationalist without unreason; an empiricist without prejudice. His empiricism was radical, preferring correctness to consistency, truth to logic.<sup>1</sup>

I do not quote for complete agreement, because I think we have come to the point where we can and must go beyond this somewhat anarchic pluralism and relativism to a more systematic relativism. This becomes possible as we are able to discover through objective comparison of basic human values certain basic equivalences among them, which we may warrantably call "functional constants" to take scientifically the place of our outmoded categoricals and our banned arbitrary "universals." However, the present point is that James did not intend to invalidate values in his attack on absolutes and categoricals or to abolish creeds in assailing dogma. Nor was he intent on deepening the divide between science, philosophy and religion: on the contrary, he was hoping for a new rapprochement and unity among them, once philosophy and religion had renounced absolutist metaphysics and its dogmatisms.

Is such rapprochement possible? As we have already seen, only if empiricists and rationalists both make concessions. Further, these concessions must be comparable, and provide, in addition, a workable base of contact. From either side this is difficult. And lest the concession proposed for the value disciplines seem unequal or unduly great, let us make note of the fact that it is a very considerable concession, from the point of view of orthodox empiricism, to concede the scientific monism of mechanism, determinism and materialism. The scientific point of view, by making a place for values, makes obviously the concession of pluralism. In a complementary concession, the value disciplines, it seems to me, should make the concession of relativism. Frankly, this asks that they dethrone their absolutes, not as values or even as preferred values, but nonetheless as arbitrary universals, whether they be "sole ways of salvation," "perfect forms of the state or society," or self evident intellectual systems of interpretation. Difficult as this may be for our various

traditional value systems, once they do so, they thereby not only make peace with one another, but make also an honorable peace with science. For, automatically in so doing, they cease to be rival interpretations of that objective reality which it is the function of science to analyze, measure and explain, or monopolistic versions of human nature and experience, which it is, similarly, the business of social science to record and describe.

Such value pluralism, with its corollary of relativity, admittedly entails initial losses for the traditional claims and prestige of our value systems. But it also holds out to them an effective *pax romana* of values, with greater and more permanent eventual gains. It calls, in the first place, for a resolving or at least an abatement of the chronic internecine conflict of competing absolutes, now so hopelessly snared in mutual contradictoriness. Not that there must be, in consequence of this relativistic view, an anarchy or a complete downfall of values, but rather that there should be only relative and functional rightness, with no throne or absolute sovereignty in dispute. To intelligent partisans, especially those who can come within hailing distance of Royce's principle of "loyalty to loyalty," such value reciprocity might be acceptable and welcome. As we shall see later, this principle has vital relevance to the whole question of a democracy of values, which basically entails value tolerance.

There would also be as a further possibility of such value relativism a more objective confirmation of many basic human values, and on a basis of proof approximating scientific validity. For if once this broader relativistic approach could discover beneath the expected culture differentials of time and place such functional "universals" as actually may be there, these common-denominator values would stand out as pragmatically confirmed by common human experience. Either their observable generality or their comparatively established equivalence would give them status far beyond any "universals" merely asserted by orthodox dogmatisms. And the standard of value justification would then not be so very different from the accepted scientific criterion of proof—confirmable invariability in concrete human experience. After an apparent downfall and temporary banishment, many of our most prized "universals" would reappear, clothed with a newly acquired vitality and a pragmatic validity of general concurrence. So confirmed, they would be more widely ac-

ceptable and more objectively justified than would ever be possible either by the arbitrary fiat of belief or the brittle criterion of logical consistency. Paradoxically enough, then, the pluralistic approach to values opens the way to a universality and objectivity for them quite beyond the reach of the *a priori* assertions and dogmatic demands which characterize their rational and orthodox promulgations.

More important, however, than what this view contributes toward a realistic understanding of values, are the clues it offers for a more practical and consistent way of holding and advocating them. It is here that a basic connection between pluralism and intellectual democracy becomes evident. In the pluralistic frame of reference value dogmatism is outlawed. A consistent application of this invalidation would sever the trunk nerves of bigotry or arbitrary orthodoxy all along the line, applying to religious, ideological and cultural as well as to political and social values. Value profession or adherence on that basis would need to be critical and selective and tentative (in the sense that science is tentative) and revisionist in procedure rather than dogmatic, final and *en bloc*. One can visualize the difference by saying that with any articles of faith, each article would need independent scrutiny and justification and would stand, fall or be revised, be accepted, rejected or qualified accordingly. Fundamentalism of the "all or none" or "this goes with it" varieties could neither be demanded, expected nor tolerated. Value assertion would thus be a tolerant assertion of preference, not an intolerant insistence on agreement or finality. Value disciplines would take on the tentative and revisionist procedure of natural science.

Now such a rationale is needed for the effective implementation of the practical corollaries of value pluralism—tolerance and value reciprocity, and one might add, as a sturdier intellectual base for democracy. We know, of course, that we cannot get tolerance from a fanatic or reciprocity from a fundamentalist of any stripe, religious, philosophical, cultural, political or ideological. But what is often overlooked is that we cannot, soundly and safely at least, preach liberalism and at the same time abet and condone bigotry, condemn uniformitarianism and placate orthodoxy, promote tolerance and harbor the seeds of intolerance. I suggest that our duty to democracy on the plane of ideas, especially in time of crisis, is the analysis of just this problem and some consideration of its possible solution.

In this connection it is necessary to recall an earlier statement that we are for the most part unaware of the latent absolutism at the core of many of our traditional loyalties, and of the fact that this may very well condition current concepts and sanctions of democracy. The fundamentalist lineage of "hundred per-centism," for all its ancient and sacrosanct derivation, is only too obvious. It is a heritage and carry-over from religious dogmatism and extends its blind sectarian loyalties to the secular order. So hoary and traditional is it that one marvels that it could still be a typical and acceptable norm of patriotism, political or cultural. Equally obvious is the absolutist loyalty of the secular dogma of "my country, right or wrong." Such instances confront us with the paradox of democratic loyalties absolutistically conceived, dogmatically sanctioned and undemocratically practiced. Far too much of our present democratic creed and practice is cast in the mold of such blind loyalty and *en bloc* rationalization, with too many of our citizens the best of democrats for the worst of reasons—mere conformity. Apart from the theoretical absolutistic taint, it should be disconcerting to ponder that by the same token, if transported, these citizens would be "perfect" Nazis and the best of totalitarians.

But to come to less obvious instances—our democratic tolerance—of whose uniqueness and quantity we can boast with some war-rant, seems on close scrutiny qualitatively weak and unstable. It is uncritical because propagated on too emotional and too abstract a basis. Not being anchored in any definite intellectual base, it is too easily set aside in time of stress and challenge. [So it] is tolerance only in name, [or] it is simply indifference and *laissez faire* rationalized. We are all sadly acquainted with how it may blow away in time of crisis or break when challenged by self-interest, and how under stress we find ourselves, after all, unreasonably biased in favor of "our own," whether it be the mores, ideas, faiths or merely "our crowd." This is a sure sign that value bigotry is somehow still deep-rooted there. Under the surface of such frail tolerance some unreconstructed dogmatisms lie, the latent source of the emerging intolerance. This is apt to happen to any attitude lacking the stamina of deep intellectual conviction, that has been nurtured on abstract sentiment, and that has not been buttressed by an objective conception of one's own values and loyalties.



Democratic professions to the contrary, there is a reason for all this shallow tolerance, this grudging and fickle reciprocity, this blind and fanatical loyalty persisting in our social behavior. Democracy has promulgated these virtues and ideals zealously, but as attitudes and habits of thought has not implemented them successfully. First, they have been based on moral abstractions, with vague sentimental sanctions as "virtues" and "ideals," since, on the whole, idealistic liberalism and good-will humanitarianism have nursed our democratic tradition. Rarely have these attitudes been connected sensibly with self-interest or realistically bound up with a perspective turned toward one's own position and its values. Had this been the case, a sturdier tolerance and a readier reciprocity would have ensued, and with them a more enlightened type of social loyalty.

But a more enlightened loyalty involves of necessity a less bigoted national and cultural tradition. Democratic liberalism, limited both by the viewpoint of its generation and by its close affiliation with doctrinal religious and philosophical traditions, modeled its rationale of democracy too closely to authoritarian patterns, and made a creed of democratic principles. For wide acceptance or easy assent it condoned or compromised with too much dogmatism and orthodoxy. Outmoded scientifically and ideologically today, this dogmatism is the refuge of too much provincialism, intolerance and prejudice to be a healthy, expanding contemporary base for democracy. Our democratic values require an equally liberal but also a more scientific and realistic rationale today. This is why we presume to suggest pluralism as a more appropriate and effective democratic rationale.

We must live in terms of our own particular institutions and mores, assert and cherish our own specific values, and we could not, even if it were desirable, uproot our own traditions and loyalties. But that is no justification for identifying them *en bloc* with an ideal like democracy, as though they were a perfect set of architectural specifications for the concept itself. So the only way of freeing our minds from such hypostasizing, from its provincial limitations and dogmatic bias, is by way of a relativism which reveals our values in proper objective perspective with other sets of values. Through this we may arrive at some clearer recognition of the basic unity or correspondence of our values with those of other men, however dissimilar they may appear

on the surface or however differently they may be systematized and sanctioned. Discriminating objective comparison of this sort, using the same yardstick, can alone give us proper social and cultural scale and perspective. Toward this end, value pluralism has a point of view able to lift us out of the egocentric and ethnocentric predicaments which are without exception involved. This should temper our loyalties with intelligence and tolerance and scotch the potential fanaticism and bigotry which otherwise lurk under blind loyalty and dogmatic faith in our values. We can then take on our particular value systems with temperate and enlightened attachment, and can be sectarian without provincialism and loyal without intolerance.

Since the relativist point of view focuses in an immediately transformed relationship and attitude toward one's own group values, it is no rare and distant principle, but has, once instated, practical progressive applicability to everyday life. It has more chances thus of becoming habitual. Most importantly perhaps, it breaks down the worship of the form—that dangerous identification of the symbol with the value, which is the prime psychological root of the fallacies and errors we have been discussing. We might pose it as the acid test for an enlightened value loyalty that it is able to distinguish between the symbol and form of its loyalty and the essence and objective of that loyalty. Such critical insight, for example, would recognize a real basic similarity or functional equivalence in other values, even when cloaked in considerable superficial difference. Nor, on the other hand, would it credit any merely superficial conformity with real loyalty. And so, the viewpoint equips us not only to tolerate difference but enables us to bridge divergence by recognizing commonality wherever present. In social practice this is no scholastic virtue; it has high practical consequences for democratic living, since it puts the premium upon equivalence not upon identity, calls for co-operation rather than for conformity and promotes reciprocity instead of factional antagonism. Authoritarianism, dogmatism and bigotry just cannot take root and grow in such intellectual soil.

Finally, we may assess the possible gains under this more pragmatic and progressive rationale for democratic thought and action briefly under two heads: what these fresh and stimulating sanctions promise internally for democracy on the national front and what they require externally on the international front in terms of what is vaguely—all too vaguely—styled world democracy.

For democracy in its internal aspects, much of pluralism's gains would consist in a more practical implementation of the traditional democratic values, but there would also be some new sanctions and emphases. So far, of course, as these things can be intellectually implemented, new support would unquestionably be given to the enlargement of the democratic life, and quite as importantly, some concern taken for the correction of its aberrations and abuses. On the corrective side, particular impetus needs to be given toward the liberalizing of democracy's tradition of tolerance, to more effective protection and integration of minority and non-conformist groups, for the protection of the majority itself against illiberalism, bigotry and cultural conceit, and toward the tempering of the quality of patriotism and sub-group loyalties. As to new sanctions, the campaign for the re-vamping of democracy has already put special emphasis on what is currently styled "cultural pluralism" as a proposed liberal rationale for our national democracy. This indeed is but a corollary of the larger relativism and pluralism under discussion. Under it, much can be done toward the more effective bridging of the divergencies of institutional life and traditions which, though sometimes conceived as peculiarly characteristic of American society, are rapidly becoming typical of all cosmopolitan modern society. These principles call for promoting respect for difference, for safeguarding respect for the individual, thus preventing the submergence of the individual in enforced conformity, and for the promotion of commonality over and above such differences. Finally, more on the intellectual side, additional motivation is generated for the reinforcement of all the traditional democratic freedoms, but most particularly for the freedom of the mind. For it is in the field of social thinking that freedom of the mind can be most practically established, and no more direct path to that exists than through the promotion of an unbiased scientific conception of the place of the national culture in the world.

For democracy in its external aspects both the situation and the prospects are less clear. However, the world crisis poses the issues clearly enough. Democracy has encountered a fighting antithesis, and has awakened from considerable lethargy and decadence to a sharpened realization of its own basic values. This should lead ultimately to a clarified view of its ultimate objectives. The crisis holds also the potential gain of more realistic understanding on the part

of democracy of its own shortcomings, since if totalitarianism is its moral antithesis as well as its political enemy, it must fight internally to purge its own culture of the totalitarian qualities of dogmatism, absolutism and tyranny, latent and actual.

Yet as a nation we are vague about world democracy and none too well equipped for its prosecution. It was our intellectual unpreparedness as a nation for thinking consistently in any such terms which stultified our initiative in the peace of 1918 and our participation in the germinal efforts of a democratic world order under the League of Nations plan, or should we say concept, since the plan minimized it so seriously? Today again, we stand aghast before a self-created dilemma of an impracticable national provinciality of isolationism and a vague idea of a world order made over presumably on an enlarged pattern of our own. There is danger, if we insist on identifying such a cause arbitrarily with our own institutional forms and culture values of its becoming a presumptuous, even though well-intentioned idealistic uniformitarianism. Should this be the case, then only a force crusade for democratic uniformitarianism is in prospect, for that could never come about by force of persuasion.

It is here that the defective perspective of our patriotism and our culture values reveals its seriously limiting character. This is intellectually the greatest single obstacle to any extension of the democratic way of life on an international scale. Surely here the need for the insight and practical sanity of the pluralistic viewpoint is clear. There is a reasonable chance of success to the extent we can disengage the objectives of democracy from the particular institutional forms by which we practice it, and can pierce through to common denominators of equivalent objectives.

The intellectual core of the problems of the peace, should it lie in our control and leadership, will be the discovery of the necessary common denominators and the basic equivalences involved in a democratic world order or democracy on a world scale. I do not hazard to guess at them; but certain specifications may be stated which I believe they will have to meet, if they are to be successful. A reasonable democratic peace (like no other peace before it) must integrate victors and vanquished alike, and justly. With no shadow of cultural superiority, it must respectfully protect the cultural values and institutional forms and traditions of a vast con-

geries of peoples and races—European, Asiatic, African, American, Australasian. Somehow cultural pluralism may yield a touchstone for such thinking. Direct participational representation of all considerable groups must be provided for, although how imperialism is to concede this is almost beyond immediate imagining. That most absolutistic of all our secular concepts, the autonomous, sacrosanct character of national sovereignty, must surely be modified and voluntarily abridged. Daring reciprocities will have to be worked out if the basic traditional democratic freedoms are ever to be transposed to world practice, not to mention the complicated reconstruction of economic life which consistent reciprocity will demand in this field. One suspects that the practical exigencies of world reconstruction will force many of these issues to solution from the practical side, leaving us intellectuals to rationalize the changes *ex post facto*. Out of the crisis may yet come the forced extension of democratic values and mechanisms in ways that we have not had courage to think of since the days of democracy's early eighteenth century conception, when it was naively, but perhaps very correctly assumed that to have validity at all democracy must have world vogue.

What intellectuals can do for the extension of the democratic way of life is to discipline our thinking critically into some sort of realistic world-mindedness. Broadening our cultural values and tempering our orthodoxies is of infinitely more service to enlarged democracy than direct praise and advocacy of democracy itself. For until broadened by relativism and reconstructed accordingly, our current democratic traditions and practice are not ready for world-wide application. Considerable political and cultural dogmatism, in the form of culture bias, nation worship, and racism, still stands in the way and must first be invalidated and abandoned. In sum, if we refuse to orient ourselves courageously and intelligently to a universe of peoples and cultures, and continue to base our prime values on fractional segments of nation, race, sect, or particular types of institutional culture, there is indeed little or no hope for a stable world order of any kind—democratic or otherwise. Even when the segment is itself a democratic order, its expansion to world proportions will not necessarily create a world democracy. The democratic mind needs clarifying for the better guidance of the democratic will.

But fortunately, the same correctives needed for the sound main-

tenance of democracy are also the most promising basis for its expansion. The hostile forces both within and without are of the same type, and stem from absolutism of one sort or another. The initial suggestion of a vital connection between democracy and pluralism arose from the rather more apparent connection between absolutism and monism. But so destructive has pluralism been of the closed system thinking on which absolutist values and authoritarian dogmatisms thrive that it has proved itself no mere logical antithesis but their specific intellectual antidote. In the present crisis democracy needs the support of the most effective rationale available for the justification and defense of its characteristic values. While we should not be stampeded into pluralism merely by the present emergency, it is nonetheless our handiest intellectual weapon against the totalitarian challenge, but if, as we have seen, it can also make a constructive contribution to the internal fortification of democracy, then it is even more permanently justified and should on that score be doubly welcomed.

#### NOTES

1. Horace Kallen, "William James and Henri Bergson," pp. 10-11. [Complete reference unknown.—ed.]

#### APPENDIX

*Lyman Bryson:* I am heartily in accord with this paper, on all of its chief points, and I admire the conciseness and clarity with which it states so much that is *à propos* of the deliberations of this Conference. My comments are only notes added in the hope that they are what Professor Locke himself might have said in a longer discussion.

More could be made, I believe, of the dangers of the overweening desire for personal integration that fails to take into account the fact that the personality, also, is in some ways better off for the practice of a judicious pluralism. By this I mean that we have a natural tendency toward an agglutination of values. If we are loyal to one set of institutions, such as what we call "democracy," we are uncomfortable unless we assert that the other values, to which we may also be loyal, such as what we call "Christianity," are necessary to democracy. At our Conference meetings we have heard many assertions that democracy can exist only in a Christian state, in spite of history and all contemporary facts to the contrary.

We are not content to say that democracy and the Christian-Judaic tradition are highly sympathetic with each other, or useful to each other. They must be, each to the other, *sine qua non*. Professor Locke might have pointed out that within each single pattern of loyalties an organic diversity may make not for weakness but for flexibility and strength.

The author might also have pointed out, as was perhaps implied in some of the things he did have space for, that unity becomes the more desirable as the issues rise in the levels of generality. Thus, roughly, we need not agree on how freedom should be used but we would still agree that it was a value to be supremely prized. We might agree on the importance of exercising political suffrage but disagree in our use of it. And still above this, we might argue about freedom but agree that values, to be desirable, must contribute to the strength and dignity of men. The value that has been repeatedly called the chief good of democratic peoples, the supreme worth of the individual, is just such a value of the highest possible generality and we are dogmatic in our assertion of it. Diversity does not have the same utility on all levels but, one must add, an authoritarian determination of the levels on which diversity can be permitted is a very effective enslavement. I would have enjoyed a discussion of this point in the paper.

I could wish, also, that there had been more space to consider the importance of diversity, or plural systems of values, in relation to social change. It is when a culture is undergoing transformation, when diversity is most difficult to maintain, that it is of greatest importance. It is true, I think, that pluralistic groups change with less cost and more efficiency, whenever environment makes change rationally desirable, than do any other kinds of groups. This is one of the strongest arguments in favor of democratic procedures in all forms of social decision.

*Erwin R. Goodenough*: The Conference was originally called together to see what scientists, philosophers, and theologians could do to unite the more abstract thought and thinkers of the present in defending democracy. We were alarmed at what we had seen happen to our ideas (and our kind) in Russia, Italy and Germany, and we met to defend our way of life and thought and to strengthen the organization of society which makes such life and thought possible.

This paper is one of the few which seemed to me presented in the original spirit of our meeting. That philosophy which recognizes the conflict of various suggested ultimates and axioms and the complete inadequacy of our data to select between them (as witnessed by the inability of reasoning philosophers of different schools to convince each other by

reasoning); that philosophy which tries to take the very conflict as its starting point and develop a *modus vivendi* out of it, is called pluralism. It is satisfactory to no one, or to very few, as an ultimate philosophy. Certainly Professor Locke is peering behind and beyond it as steadily, as wistfully, as any idealist. He proposes it, and I enthusiastically support it, precisely for what it is—a way of uniting for action in a world of conflict and ignorance. It is a typically American philosophy, or at least Anglo-Saxon, and it is not coincidence that it is best understood in the countries most bitterly opposed to totalitarianism. Over and again the various absolutist philosophies suggested in the Conference have shown that once in power they would be dangerously like the closed systems (at least in being closed), which we want to oppress. Here is genuinely the philosophy of democracy—not a very brilliant philosophy, as democracy itself is not a very brilliant form of organizing society, but still the philosophy which made democratic arguments, from those in the village store to those in the Senate, possible. I am sure that if we go on to discuss more practical problems at next year's meeting, our discussion will be based, tacitly if not otherwise, upon the wise principles Professor Locke has set forth. I am still more sure that if our discussion of practical problems is not thus based, it will get nowhere.

*Lawrence K. Frank:* In emphasizing the need for pluralistic understanding, this paper has pointed to an exceedingly important problem that will face the post-World War. If we look forward to the construction of some sort of world order in which the peoples of different cultures and religions can participate, we will need a pluralistic understanding and a broader, more sympathetic approach to many of the exigent questions of human welfare and social order; otherwise a parochial devotion to our own metaphysics and religious convictions, however precious to us, will inevitably hamper us in any attempt to achieve world order and peace in concert with peoples whose cultural traditions and beliefs are so radically different from our own.

In pleading for a relativistic approach to our own values and to those of other peoples and in calling for a recognition of equivalents in cultures rather than demanding identity, Dr. Locke has contributed something that merits the careful consideration of all those participating in this conference. Without such understanding, we are more than liable to continue the same dogmatic intolerance that has so long blighted Western European culture and blinded us to the values and virtues which other peoples, often with longer and richer historical pasts than we, cherish as their way of life.



THE  
PHILOSOPHY OF  
ALAIN LOCKE  
Harlem Renaissance  
and Beyond

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