See my tweets summarizing Day 1 and Day 3
We had another great day of the Descartes Lectures & Conference on “Science, Values, and Democracy” yesterday. Today generated a little more discussion on Twitter, which I inserted, out of chronological order.
Heather’s Lecture
Time for Heather Douglas's #DescartesLectures on #ScienceValuesDemocracy #2: "Science and Democracy: Squaring Expertise w/ Accountability."
— Matthew J Brown (@thehangedman) September 6, 2016
HD: Values are woven into fabric of science. We depend on this fabric for decision-making in democratic societies. #ScienceValuesDemocracy
— Matthew J Brown (@thehangedman) September 6, 2016
HD: Science is a source of criticism of (empirical underpinnings of) our ideological commitments, understanding of the world.
— Matthew J Brown (@thehangedman) September 6, 2016
HD: Problems for use of science in democracy: Diversity and instability of science, professionalization & specialization. #DescartesLectures
— Matthew J Brown (@thehangedman) September 6, 2016
HD: How should the values that shape science be part of the democratic accountability of science. [This is a crucial question, IMO.]
— Matthew J Brown (@thehangedman) September 6, 2016
HD: Sam Harris's moral landscape, Neil DeGrasse Tyson's Rationalia = LOL. We need values to inform social decisions. #DescartesLectures
— Matthew J Brown (@thehangedman) September 6, 2016
HD on expertise: Not always readily assessable via instrumental success. Experts must be able to explain their judgments. #DescartesLectures
— Matthew J Brown (@thehangedman) September 6, 2016
This seems to go very much against common views on expertise that emphasize tacit knowledge and skill. #DescartesLectures
— Matthew J Brown (@thehangedman) September 6, 2016
I want to ask Heather about this-for these accounts, identify expertise by the INABILITY to give explicit account https://t.co/42UQW7vtKJ
— Sarah Wieten fediscience.org/@sarahwieten (@SarahWieten) September 6, 2016
HD made it clear later that she didn't take this as a definition of expertise, but an important feature of expert ADVISORS.
— Matthew J Brown (@thehangedman) September 7, 2016
HD: There is no value-free expertise, b/c experts use values to make judgments, though they should be transparent. #DescartesLectures
— Matthew J Brown (@thehangedman) September 6, 2016
HD: Experts are accountable to expert community for accuracy, and to citizens for their value judgments. #ScienceValuesDemocracy
— Matthew J Brown (@thehangedman) September 6, 2016
HD: L'Aquila case. Scientific community failed to hold seismologists accountable for their failure. #DescartesLectures
— Matthew J Brown (@thehangedman) September 6, 2016
HD: When scientists circle the wagons against (legit) public criticism, they fail in their responsibility to hold each other accountable.
— Matthew J Brown (@thehangedman) September 6, 2016
HD: Democratic accountability of science advice – diversity of committees, political accountability of advisees. #DescartesLectures
— Matthew J Brown (@thehangedman) September 6, 2016
HD: Robust plurality of advising mechanisms reduces potential corruption & abuse. #ScienceValuesDemocracy #DescartesLectures
— Matthew J Brown (@thehangedman) September 6, 2016
HD: Experts must also make sure their peers' judgments are actually reflective of their stated value judgments. #DescartesLectures
— Matthew J Brown (@thehangedman) September 6, 2016
HD: Elected decision-makers should not be required to follow expert advice. This would be detrimental to democracy. #DescartesLectures
— Matthew J Brown (@thehangedman) September 6, 2016
HD: BUT, they should not reject the evidence or strength of evidence, but argue it is insufficient, given their values. #DescartesLectures
— Matthew J Brown (@thehangedman) September 6, 2016
https://twitter.com/danieljhicks/status/773281220801114112
I think it could be insufficient not only in quantity but in quality or in type? @maya_goldenberg
— Matthew J Brown (@thehangedman) September 6, 2016
how would quality of evidence be insufficient in terms of one's (social?) values? Wrong question being pursued, I think
— Maya Goldenberg (@maya_goldenberg) September 6, 2016
I'm not sure why one couldn't use inductive risk arguments to demand certain types or quality of evidence.
— Matthew J Brown (@thehangedman) September 7, 2016
HD: Privately-funded science produces private-interest science. We (also) need (more) public-interest science. #ScienceValuesDemocracy
— Matthew J Brown (@thehangedman) September 6, 2016
HD: Don't rely only on private science funding, and don't gear public funding towards private interests. #DescartesLectures
— Matthew J Brown (@thehangedman) September 6, 2016
HD: There is no perfect science-policy system. But we need accountability for experts and public-interest science. #DescartesLectures
— Matthew J Brown (@thehangedman) September 6, 2016
A lot of the initial discussion of #DescartesLectures #2 centered around the definition of "expertise" and accountability to other experts.
— Matthew J Brown (@thehangedman) September 6, 2016
(As I referenced above, we got to the root of this at our discussion at dinner.)
Commentaries
Commentary on Douglas's #DescartesLectures 2 by Arthur Petersen, focused on IPCC.
— Matthew J Brown (@thehangedman) September 6, 2016
AP: Climate models, difficult for non-expert to assess. How to communicate to policy-makers? #DescartesLectures #ScienceValuesDemocracy
— Matthew J Brown (@thehangedman) September 6, 2016
AP: Accounting for all uncertainties, and communicating effectively, is the issue. #DescartesLectures
— Matthew J Brown (@thehangedman) September 6, 2016
AP: Why did the IPCC 2001 say "likely" (tech meaning 66% certainty) when models say "99% certainty"? Conservatism, limited trust of models.
— Matthew J Brown (@thehangedman) September 6, 2016
AP: IPCC 2007 – now "very likely." Again, experts did (really) not have an explanation for that rating of uncertainty. #DescartesLectures
— Matthew J Brown (@thehangedman) September 6, 2016
AP: It is GOOD that governments have a say in how IPCC summarizes the science. Both groups should be more diplomatic. #DescartesLectures
— Matthew J Brown (@thehangedman) September 6, 2016
AP: Collaborations in IPCC negotiations arise from alphabetic seating chart. #DescartesLectures
— Matthew J Brown (@thehangedman) September 6, 2016
Woah. Makes total sense; is this documented anywhere? Would love to be able to read more/cite.
— Eric Kennedy (@ericbkennedy) September 6, 2016
Netherlands & New Zealand work together! Arthur Petersen was speaking from his experience, but he has written a bit about it.
— Matthew J Brown (@thehangedman) September 6, 2016
AP: IPCC wants to hide political element of plenary process, though the process improves the summary – more clear and readable.
— Matthew J Brown (@thehangedman) September 6, 2016
Now, comments from Torsten Wilholt. Focused on accountability to citizenry. #DescartesLectures #ScienceValuesDemocracy
— Matthew J Brown (@thehangedman) September 6, 2016
TW: Both diversity/pluralism and transparency are good features of science advisory committees. But not adequate for public accountability.
— Matthew J Brown (@thehangedman) September 6, 2016
TW: We should not make experts directly answerable to citizens. Only accountable for values they use, not for accuracy of claims.
— Matthew J Brown (@thehangedman) September 6, 2016
TW: Accountability is not all there is to democracy. Not just negative controls. Need richer account of democracy. #DescartesLectures
— Matthew J Brown (@thehangedman) September 6, 2016
TW: Citizens must help form a shared conception of the common good through public reasoning. #DescartesLectures#ScienceValuesDemocracy
— Matthew J Brown (@thehangedman) September 6, 2016
TW: Closed-door proceedings thus interfere with democratic process. #DescartesLectures
— Matthew J Brown (@thehangedman) September 6, 2016
TW: Trustworthiness of experts cannot be established by negative controls. #DescartesLectures #ScienceValuesDemocracy
— Matthew J Brown (@thehangedman) September 6, 2016
TW agrees with HD that public-interest science cannot be effectively achieved by central planning, but need centralized, local mechanisms.
— Matthew J Brown (@thehangedman) September 6, 2016
TW: Need incentives for public-interest science in tenure & promotion, award of grants, society membership, etc. #DescartesLectures
— Matthew J Brown (@thehangedman) September 6, 2016
HD would love to explore details of IPCC w/ AP. Agrees w/ TW about complexity of democracy. #DescartesLectures #ScienceValuesDemocracy
— Matthew J Brown (@thehangedman) September 6, 2016
Afternoon Sessions!
Afternoon sessions! #DescartesLectures #ScienceValuesDemocracy
— Matthew J Brown (@thehangedman) September 6, 2016
Kian Mintz-Woo: When are moral philosophers ethical experts? In some domains they aren't. #DescartesLectures #ScienceValuesDemocracy
— Matthew J Brown (@thehangedman) September 6, 2016
KMW: Ethical expertise vs moral expertise. Both domain-dependent. EE – Hypothetical reasoning. ME – Knows true moral theory, Categorical r.
— Matthew J Brown (@thehangedman) September 6, 2016
KMW is working very much with a top-down account of applied ethics. Ethics experts deal with foundational moral theories. #DescartesLectures
— Matthew J Brown (@thehangedman) September 6, 2016
KMW: Ethically Explicit Domains use frameworks or models with ethical assumptions build in. E.g., climate economics. #DescartesLectures
— Matthew J Brown (@thehangedman) September 6, 2016
KMW: In EED, moral philosophers lack ethical expertise. They can dispute the whole framework, but have nil to add to debates within domain.
— Matthew J Brown (@thehangedman) September 6, 2016
KMW: Ethically overdetermined domains – All plausible moral theories converge on particular questions. Also, no ethical expertise.
— Matthew J Brown (@thehangedman) September 6, 2016
In Q&A, KMW allows that by "moral theory" he doesn't necessarily mean to rule out particularism or casuistry. #ScienceValuesDemocracy
— Matthew J Brown (@thehangedman) September 6, 2016
My paper was next. Here is the main upshot of my paper:
Ideal of Moral Imagination: Encouraging scientists to recognize decision-point, creatively explore possible choices, empathetically recognize potential stakeholders, and discover morally salient aspects and consequences of the decision via dramatic rehearsal.
After that, I was moderating, and so I didn’t Tweet. But I had to add this:
Yesterday, I was moderating – @SarahWieten's paper was good. Making progress on account of "values that fit" inquiries. #DescartesLectures
— Matthew J Brown (@thehangedman) September 7, 2016
On to Day 3!